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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON FISCAL POLICY, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
BY 
BAUYRZHAN YEDGENOV 
AUGUST 2017 
Committee Chair: Dr. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
Chapter 1 revisits the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth 
by addressing the endogeneity. We use an instrumental variable approach based on two 
geography variables, namely a Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) and country size. We find 
that both instruments are strong and valid in the first stage regression and that a ten percent 
increase in decentralization measured by the expenditure or revenue share of subnational 
government in total government expenditures or revenues increases GDP per capita growth by 
approximately 0.4 percentage points. Moreover, we find that the results are more pronounced in 
the case of developed countries with a higher magnitude of the impact of revenue 
decentralization and lower impact of expenditure decentralization, while for a sample of 
developing countries both decentralization measures are insignificant. 
Chapter 2 explores the role of the tax structure and its key elements on the volatility of 
output growth. We account for both embedded automatic stabilizers measured by progressivity 
of the tax system and discretionary policy by accounting for the actual levels of revenue and its 
composition measured by tax mix ratio or the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes. We find that 
higher reliance on direct taxes versus indirect taxes is a significant stabilizing factor for output 
volatility for the whole sample of all countries and the subsample of lower income countries. For 
  
 
the subsample of high-income countries, we find a significant stabilizing impact of progressivity 
in the income tax structure, especially when there is higher reliance on personal income tax 
revenue. 
Chapter 3 reexamines the causal link between institutional quality and economic 
development using "Malaria Endemicity" as an instrument for institutions.  This instrument is 
superior to the previously used instruments in the literature which suffered from measurement 
error. Because the Malaria Endemicity measure captures the malaria environment before the 
discovery that mosquitoes transmit the disease and before the successful eradication efforts that 
followed, it is exogenous to both institutional quality and economic development. We find 
Malaria Endemicity a valid strong instrument which yields larger significant effects of 
institutions on economic development than those obtained in the previous literature. 
INDEX WORDS: Fiscal decentralization, Economic development, Progressivity, Tax structure, 
Malaria, Geography  
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CHAPTER 1. IDENTIFYING AND DISENTANGLING THE IMPACT OF FISCAL 
DECENTRALIZATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. Motivation: Identification problem 
The question of the causal impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has been 
one of the most researched issues in the literature on fiscal federalism. A quick scholarly search 
reveals up to 60 published works on the impact of fiscal decentralization on various economic 
indicators, and more than half of those focus on economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
2016, Baskaran and Feld, 2013). However, a general glance at this vast literature reveals that 
practically all the previous papers are flawed because they suffer from a fundamental 
identification problem: economic growth is impacted by decentralization, but decentralization 
itself can be affected by economic growth. This puts into question the received wisdom on the 
causal impact of fiscal decentralization on the growth and development of a large number of 
countries around the world that have embraced decentralized governance in recent decades.1 In 
fact, according to data gathered by Garman et al. (2001), more than 80% of the 75 developing 
countries analyzed had been undergoing some decentralization of authority by the beginning of 
the millennium. In the case of developed countries, the index of regional authority computed by 
Hooghe et al. (2010) for 42 democracies and semi-democracies reveals that 70% of countries 
have decentralized since 1950. 
There are several reasons behind this trend. For most countries, fiscal decentralization has 
been a means for increasing the efficiency of government service delivery to achieve higher 
economic growth, while other nations have embraced decentralization following discontent with 
                                                          
1 The focus on this paper is on decentralization and economic growth. However, there are also considerable 
literature on the impact of decentralization of a long list of variables of interest such as macroeconomic stability, 
income distribution or corruption, which also suffer from the very similar identification issue of endogeneity.     
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failed central planning practices, especially for former Soviet countries. In other cases, 
decentralization has been used to appease the eruption of conflict and to maintain territorial unity 
(Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2016).  
Figure 1 depicts the map of the world with lowest to highest degrees of fiscal 
decentralization as measured by fiscal decentralization index by Ivanyna and Shah (2012). The 
green colored countries are the most decentralized countries, while red colored countries are the 
least. While many factors are affecting the economic growth, it can be seen that most developed 
countries, but also large and with federal systems like the US, Canada, Australia and also 
countries in Western Europe are the most decentralized. At the same time, most countries of 
Africa which are least developed are least decentralized.  
 
Figure 1 Map of fiscal decentralization index (Source: Ivanyna and Shah, 2012) 
When we look at the groups of countries that are members of OECD, we can see that 
during last decade, the average share of sub-national government in total government revenue 
and expenditure is higher compared to non-OECD countries (table 1). In the case of revenue 
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decentralization, the average share of the sub-national government in OECD countries is 21.5% 
versus 17.6% in non-OECD countries. The difference is even larger in the case of expenditure 
decentralization with an average share of sub-national government in the expenditure of 29.2% 
for OECD group versus 17.5% for the non-OECD group. 
Table 1 Summary statistics of fiscal decentralization measures, 2000-2012 
  
Revenue Decentralization  
(share of sub-national revenue 
in total) 
Expenditure Decentralization  
(share of sub-national 
expenditure in total) 
  OECD 
Non-
OECD 
OECD Non-OECD 
Mean 21.50% 17.60% 29.20% 17.50% 
Standard 
Deviation 
14.00% 14.90% 14.40% 14.40% 
Minimum 1.20% 0.13% 3.90% 0.30% 
Maximum 63.50% 84.10% 65.40% 81.80% 
Source: Own calculation. 
One of the most important questions posed in the decentralization literature is whether 
economic growth is a result of fiscal decentralization or a cause of it. In other words, do most 
developed countries enjoy high-income levels partly because of having adopted fiscally 
decentralized systems, or are they fiscally decentralized because they are developed? This 
question leads to the basic identification problem due to the presence of “reverse causality” or 
“simultaneity.” 
Another important dimension of the identification problem is the potential presence of 
omitted unobserved factors, which are both correlated with fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth. The presence of these unobserved factors can lead to the biased estimation of the impact 
of fiscal decentralization. This latter problem can only be partially controlled for by using fixed 
effect estimation methods when the unobserved factors are time invariant. Because of the 
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importance of these issues, there have been different attempts to solve these identification 
problems using various instrumental variables or more advanced econometric techniques, such as 
System GMM (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016). However, to this date, none of these approaches 
can claim to solve the pervasive identification problem in the literature dealing with the effects 
of fiscal decentralization. 
Any estimation of the causal impact of fiscal decentralization without accounting for 
these identification issues will be flawed and cannot be truly reliable, let alone be the basis for 
policy recommendations. One of the proven best ways to identify the causal effect in 
econometrics is the use of instrumental variables or shortly the IV method. However, as obvious 
and straightforward as it sounds, finding the right instrument can be fraught with difficulties and 
simply become a treasure hunt. A good instrument needs to be highly correlated with fiscal 
decentralization but uncorrelated with economic growth. Intuitively, it is rather apparent that 
finding an adequate instrument can be a challenge.  In this essay, we claim to have found a good 
candidate for such instrument – geography.  
Our first task will be to show that the geography related variables are highly correlated 
with fiscal decentralization. Measuring it in several dimensions explained further, we make the 
case that geography is indeed highly correlated with fiscal decentralization. The relationship 
between decentralization and geography is theoretically developed using the models in Arzaghi 
and Henderson (2005), and Panizza (1999) and its empirical validity has been positively tested in 
Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, and Yedgenov (2017). The basic idea behind this 
relationship is that geographic conditions like significant variations in elevation and country size 
have long influenced the degree of heterogeneity in tastes and preferences for local and regional 
public goods and services in countries around the world. The persistence of heterogeneity in 
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demand for public services eventually leads to heightened demand for fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
decentralization. Even though the effect of geography can be weakened by migration, the overall 
effect is likely to endure due to the assimilation of newcomers.  
The second task will be to show that geography, measured in terms of elevation and 
country size, is uncorrelated with economic growth. In other words, geography does not have 
direct or unobserved indirect effect on economic growth except through fiscal decentralization. It 
is fairly obvious that geography is exogenous to economic growth; that is, that economic growth 
does not affect geography. On the other hand, geography can very well be directly correlated 
with economic growth as well as indirectly through fiscal decentralization itself or other venues. 
Even though certain particular dimensions of geography other than elevation heterogeneity can 
play a direct role in economic growth as proposed by Sachs and Warner (1997) and Gallup, 
Mellinger and Sachs (1999), we argue that by controlling for the role of institutions, the role of 
geography can be neutralized or eliminated, as has been shown by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2003). Moreover, we argue that geography affects the 
mixture of economic activity, not the growth of income. In other words, some economic 
activities may be available for highlanders, while other activities would be available for 
lowlanders. To round up our argument, we also need to control for the indirect channels other 
than fiscal decentralization through which our geography measures may affect economic growth. 
In conclusion, in this paper, we claim that while geography is highly correlated with 
fiscal decentralization through the use of appropriate control variables, geography is neither 
directly nor indirectly correlated with economic growth except through fiscal decentralization. 
Therefore, we claim that geography can be used as a strong and reliable instrument for the 
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endogenous fiscal decentralization in estimating the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth.  
In the empirical analysis, we find that both geography measures being proposed are 
strong and valid as instruments for fiscal decentralization in the first stage of 2SLS approach. 
Moreover, we find that fiscal decentralization measured as a share of expenditure or revenue of 
subnational government in total general government expenditure or revenue has a significant 
positive impact on economic growth, especially in the case of developed countries. Our findings 
show that a ten percent increase in the share of subnational expenditure in total general 
government expenditures will increase GDP per capita growth by 0.42 percentage points, while a 
ten percent increase in the share of subnational revenue in total general government revenue will 
increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.41 percentage points. Overall, these findings support 
the side of the literature that find a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
(Yilmaz, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Breuss and Eller, 2004; Iimi, 2005). 
More specifically, these coefficients are significantly smaller than the average of 0.6 reported in 
studies that report positive impact for both developed and developing countries (Iimi, 2005), and 
even studies that are done within-country that usually report coefficient above 1.  
On the other hand, for the sample of developed countries, the results are still statistically 
significant with the magnitudes for expenditure and revenue decentralization coefficient of 0.25 
and 0.52, respectively, which is positive and larger than average of 0.12-0.15 percentage points 
reported in similar studies (Thiessen, 2003). However, for developing countries, the coefficients 
are not significant at the 10 percent confidence level anymore and supports another strand of 
literature (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
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We must note that the lack of time variance in the geography instruments imposes 
constraints on how we are able to use them to address the reverse causality problem between 
decentralization and economic growth. In particular, this limitation precludes using fixed effect 
estimation to account for unobserved omitted country fixed effects. Therefore, as the next best 
alternatives, we use the pooled cross sectional regression analysis and panel random effect 
estimation.  
2. Review of the relevant past literature: Theory and Empirics 
2.1 Theory of fiscal federalism 
The traditional theory of fiscal decentralization is based on seminal papers by Tiebout 
(1956) and Oates (1972) among others. According to Oates (1972), the main justification for 
decentralization is that local governments are more efficient at providing certain public services 
than higher levels of government because they are more familiar with the wants and needs of 
local population. One way this greater efficiency is reached is via the “knowledge problem” as 
discussed by Hayek (1945), according to which the wide dispersion of knowledge dooms central 
planning to fail.  A second mechanism is the idea that decentralization leads to competition 
among local jurisdictions, also leading to greater economic efficiency, as discussed by Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980). Finally, according to Tiebout (1956), individuals vote with their feet and 
choose the locality which fits their needs and wants the best, thus reinforcing the efficiency 
argument even if the local government will not perfectly match the needs and wants of all 
constituents.  
The traditional theory of fiscal decentralization, based on the assumption of well-
intentioned governments and bureaucrats, is now – viewed as the “first-generation” theory of 
fiscal decentralization. More recently, there have been an increasing number of papers written 
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under what Qian and Weingast (1997) and others have called the “second-generation” theory of 
fiscal decentralization. In contrast to the first-generation, which focuses on economic efficiency,  
the second-generation theory focuses on “public choice” aspects and assuming that government 
officials may be self-interested makes use of concepts like the principal-agent problem, the 
economics of information, the new theory of the firm, organization theory, and the theory of 
contracts. The main difference is that the second-generation theory does not view public officials 
as benevolent agents that choose the best for the jurisdiction’s residents, but rather as selfish 
agents pursuing their agenda. While the first-generation theory makes an economic case for 
fiscal decentralization, the second-generation theory builds on the insights of first-generation and 
complements or contrasts the incentive to fiscal decentralization by public officials. For example, 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) stress that inter-jurisdictional competition would impose a limit 
on excessive government growth. On the other hand, as noted by Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986) and Wilson (1986) this type of competition may lead to a “race to the bottom” with 
jurisdictions inefficiently cutting taxes and lowering expenditures to gain a competitive 
advantage in attracting businesses and their investment. Moreover, decentralization may result in 
unnecessarily complex policy coordination (Oates, 2005).   
In summary, the first generation of fiscal decentralization theory states that higher fiscal 
decentralization leads to higher economic efficiency. However, the second generation theory 
puts some of these mechanisms into question and under certain frameworks and assumptions 
predicts that the opposite is possible through unhealthy competition and unnecessary complexity 
in policy coordination. Therefore, the theoretical impact of fiscal decentralization on efficiency 
and growth remain under question and calls for an empirical investigation. 
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2.2 The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Economic Growth 
For better or worse, the last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented increase in 
decentralization reforms, not only in developed countries some of which had been historically 
decentralized, but also in developing and transitional countries, the latter especially moving away 
from the perceived failings of centralized socialist planning (Drucker, 1993; World Bank, 
1996).2 There is ample consensus that the adoption of fiscally decentralized systems has been 
moved by political opportunity with the expectation that decentralization policies would result in 
higher economic growth as well as other desirable economic and institutional outcomes. Thus, it 
does not come as a surprise that a vast empirical literature has developed in an attempt to 
determine the positive –or negative—effects of decentralization on economic outputs, such as the 
rate of economic growth. 
There have been many dimensions of the study of the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
various social, political and economic factors. The most extensive and at the same time 
problematic one was and is the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. In the 
following paragraphs, we briefly review some of these empirical findings. In addition, fiscal 
decentralization is expected to impact other factors like macroeconomic stability, inequality in 
income distribution, poverty, interregional and geographical disparities, corruption and shadow 
economy, government accountability and quality, etc.3 
The vast majority of research on fiscal decentralization is focused on the causal link 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, especially in the case of developing 
                                                          
2 Even many contemporary communist regimes, such as China or Vietnam, have also moved significantly toward 
fiscally decentralized system at the same time they have adopted more market oriented economic institutions.   
3 For full review of theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of fiscal decentralization on other economic 
indicators listed review Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2016). 
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countries since so many of them reported intentions for fiscal decentralization. Based on the 
theoretical framework, it is expected that fiscal decentralization will enhance the efficiency of 
public funds allocation and therefore economic growth through information advantages and 
flexibility in adapting to citizens’ needs and preferences (Oates, 1972) and further enhanced by 
inter-jurisdictional mobility (Tiebout, 1956). On top of that, the impact on economic growth 
might be indirect through other socio-economic variables such as macroeconomics stability and 
government quality (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Moreover, Couderc and Ventelou 
(2005) along with Brueckner (2006) conclude that fiscal autonomy is associated with higher 
productivity of labor and higher steady state growth rates. However, it is not clear if the effect of 
the fiscal decentralization on economic growth is direct, or indirect through secondary economic 
factors like macroeconomic stability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003), income inequality, 
corruption, etc. Alternatively, the effect of the fiscal decentralization might be enhanced or 
dependent on interactions with institutions (Feld and Schnellenbach, 2011), political freedom 
(Iimi, 2005), or other factors.  
In the empirical quest on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, Oates 
(1995) found a significant robust positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth examining 40 countries for period 1974-1989. A similar result was found by 
Yilmaz (1999) for unitary countries, but not federal countries. Gemmel, Kneller, and Sanz 
(2013) found a positive impact of revenue decentralization.  Qiao et al. (2008) found a positive 
impact in case of China, while Feld et al. (2004) reported fiscal autonomy lead to faster 
economic growth in Switzerland. Akai and Sakata (2002) found a positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization within states and state economic growth in the United States.  
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In contrast, Davoodi and Zou (1998) found a negative relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth for 46 developing countries, and no relationship for 
OECD countries. Woller and Phillips (1998) confirm the conclusion for 23 developing countries 
finding no significant systematic relationship. Zhang and Zou (1998) studied the 28 provinces in 
China from 1980 to 1992 and found a significant negative impact of fiscal federalism on 
provincial economic growth. In their posterior work, Zhang and Zou (2001) confirmed the result 
for 29 Chinese provinces for period 1987-1993. However, in the same paper, they also studied 16 
major states of India and found a positive relationship between per-capita fiscal decentralization 
shares and state economic growth.  Xie et al. (1999), Lin and Liu (2000) and Thiessen (2003) 
also confirm negative impact of fiscal decentralization on growth. Finally, Ezcurra and 
Rodriguez-Pose (2011) and Baskaran and Feld (2013) found a negative impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth among OECD countries.  
Overall, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) concluded that there is no empirical 
consensus on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. It is true nowadays as it 
was true then. This is not a surprising conclusion given the multi-dimensional nature of fiscal 
decentralization, its many different levels of performance and the often complex economic 
picture for economic growth that is being affected by many other forces. But in addition to those 
considerations, there are two main fundamental issues that undermine the validity of all the 
previous results in the literature (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016).  
The first issue is the measurement of the degree of fiscal decentralization. The right 
measure has to take in to account the multidimensional nature of fiscal decentralization both in 
revenue and expenditure side, and include the effective degree of power in setting fiscal policies 
by local jurisdictions. The most frequently used measures of fiscal decentralization are the shares 
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of sub-national revenue and expenditure in total revenue and total expenditure, respectively. 
Although universally available and straight-forward measure, both may over or underestimate 
the effective level of fiscal autonomy and decentralization. There have been proposals of various 
measures to address this issue, namely a proposed Regional Authority Index (RAI) by Hooghe, 
Marks, and Schakel (2010), however, due to lack of information it could be computed only for 
46 democracies and quasi-democracies. There are also measures of sub-federal fiscal autonomy 
to capture the degree of local government control over local budgets. However, the data is 
limited to OECD countries which are superior in data collection (Baskaran and Feld, 2013). 
The second issue is the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. It is difficult to disentangle 
the correlation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth to get the pure causal effect 
of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization may impact economic growth, just as economic 
growth may enhance fiscal decentralization, leading to reverse causality. The earlier studies 
barely acknowledged the endogeneity issues, while later studies offered possible, but mostly 
inadequate, solutions. For example, some studies use initial values of the independent variables 
to reduce the endogeneity issue (Akai and Sakata, 2002; Bodman et al., 2009), while other 
studies proposed using lagged independent variables as IVs (Iimi, 2005; Enikopolov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gemmel, Kneller and Sanz, 2013). However, being a complex policy 
reform, the fiscal decentralization changes are stable over-time and therefore susceptible to auto-
correlation over time (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016). Therefore, using initial or lagged values 
are likely to be just as endogenous with regards to economic growth.  
Other studies have used a variety of IVs like lagged democracy (Perez-Sebastian and 
Raveh, 2013) and country’s legal origin (La Porta et al, 1999). Although also appealing, both of 
these variables are highly correlated with economic growth itself, even using lagged values, and 
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therefore cannot truly satisfy exclusion restriction. Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007) tried to 
use the land area as an IV as part of a robustness test. However, they reported only first stage 
where area and it’s interactions with other independent variables are usually insignificant. 
A fair conclusion from this literature is that the causal effect of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth remains an open question. Beyond the many cases of contradictory findings, 
practically all previous empirical work on the question suffers from the endogeneity problem due 
to reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  
The main objective of this paper is to address the issue of endogeneity between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth using various dimensions of geography as instrumental 
variables for fiscal decentralization. The validity of geography as an IV for fiscal 
decentralization is carefully scrutinized but ultimately supported in our analysis. As we describe 
in the next section, unlike previous attempts of IV approach, our geography based IVs are truly 
exogenous and satisfy exclusion restriction, especially over time. Our estimated results using an 
IV approach show to what extent the findings in the previous literature concerning fiscal 
decentralization and growth need to be reassessed. These results are important because, beyond 
the issue of economic growth, there are many other kinds of literature examining the impact of 
fiscal decentralization of other important economic dimensions, such as macroeconomic stability 
and corruption, which potentially suffer from the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. The IV 
approach used in this paper can potentially be applied to those cases too.  
Next, we address the measurement and validity of geography as an instrument for fiscal 
decentralization. 
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3. Geography as an IV for FD. 
For geography to be an appropriate IV for fiscal decentralization in the estimations 
explaining economic growth we need to verify two conditions. First, there should be a strong 
covariance between geography and fiscal decentralization, hence the strong IV definition. In 
other words, geography has to be a significant predictor of fiscal decentralization. In technical 
terms, we need to verify that Cov (Geography, Fiscal Decentralization) ≠ 0. Second, the 
covariance between geography and economic growth should be absent. In other words, there 
should be no direct effect of geography on economic growth; but of course, we could have an 
indirect effect through fiscal decentralization. Formally, we need to verify that Cov (Geography, 
Error term)=0.4 In the following subsections, we discuss each of these two conditions. 
3.1 Covariance between Geography and Fiscal Decentralization. 
The relationship between geography and decentralization has theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings. On the theoretical side, Panizza (1999) develops a model of an existing trade-off 
between the central government’s share in the public sector and its total size. He suggests that 
the equilibrium level of decentralization should be positively correlated with the heterogeneity of 
tastes for public goods among residents, with the level of democracy, and with country size. 
Since country size along with other geographical factors like elevation and climate diversity is 
likely to lead to higher heterogeneity of preferences, we would expect these dimensions to be 
positively correlated with fiscal decentralization level in the country.  
A second model by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) is based on balancing the costs of 
sub-national administration with the “spatial decay” of goods that are provided from the center. 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Wooldridge (2012) 
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Among other factors, they predict higher decentralization the larger is the spatial decay of local 
public services provided to the hinterland by the central government.  
Spatial decay, in particular, can be thought of as a geographical decay through 
geographical factors like distance and elevation. Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Yedgenov (2017) combine these two approaches by introducing the role of geography and ethnic 
fractionalization as determinants of “spatial decay” and predict that higher geographic 
heterogeneity will lead to higher spatial decay and therefore promote fiscal decentralization. 
On the empirical side, Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez and Yedgenov (2017) use 
a broad range of geographical variables like country size, insularity (distance to nearest port), 
GINI coefficients for elevation and climate, and a Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI), 
among others. These authors find significant effects on fiscal decentralization for most of these 
variables, especially country size and the GFI. Acknowledging the time-invariance of the 
geography variables for estimation approaches involving differencing, they interact geography 
with infrastructure with the rationale that the effects of geography should be diminished with the 
development of infrastructure. With this interaction term, the impact of geography on 
decentralization decreases but it remains important and statistically significant. Other authors 
have used in the past other instrumental variables linked to geography. Kee (1977) uses 
urbanization as a control for geography and finds it positively related to fiscal decentralization. 
Panizza (1999) finds a strong positive effect of ethnic fractionalization and country size on fiscal 
decentralization. These same results are found robust using different control variables by 
Treisman (2006) and Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009). 
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3.2 Covariance between Geography and Economic Growth 
The effect of geography on economic growth has been the subject of a fierce debate 
between the proponents of the “geography hypothesis” led by Sachs (Sachs and Warner, 1997) 
and others and the proponents of the  “institutions hypothesis” led by Acemoglu (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001) and others. As elaborated by Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs (1999), 
there are three main channels through which geography may affect economic growth. First, 
countries with further distance to major ports along rivers or seas/oceans, or landlocked countries 
will have lower economic growth due to higher transportation costs that affect the volume of 
trade and technological exchange. Second, temperate climate countries have greater advantages 
for growth over tropical countries because of the higher prevalence of environmental diseases in 
the latter countries, which affects the death rate and human capital productivity. Moreover, they 
argue that food technologies that affect agricultural productivity, which is the key to economic 
development, is ecologically specific, and they do not diffuse easily across ecological zones. 
Third, the availability of large natural resource endowments at the beginning of development, 
especially coal with high costs of transportation, can be crucial for a head starts in economic 
growth. They argue that temperate zone countries have higher abundance of coal than tropical 
zones. Finally, Gallup et al. (1999) also mention other factors like increasing returns to scale of 
technologic innovation, urbanization and imperial domination by temperate zone countries, 
which further can amplify the difference in growth rates between temperate zone countries and 
tropical zone countries.  
In contrast, the “institutional hypothesis” proponents Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) argue that the key factor for economic growth is the institutional framework countries 
adopt. They define as “inclusive” institutions those that promote property rights protection and 
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encourage investments and “extractive” institutions as those that promote economic gain only for 
an elite group in the country usually led by a dictator controlled by colonists. Their argument is 
that colonists settling in countries around with similar climate to the country of origin chose to 
establish “inclusive” institutions. Otherwise, in countries with higher temperature like the tropics 
with infectious disease environments, colonists chose to establish “extractive” institutions so to 
maximize their gain through extracting gold and other resources using slave trade and leaving the 
place once their fortunes were achieved. In these latter countries, establishing “inclusive” 
institutions would threaten the colonists’ dominance, as would be the case for example if a strong 
middle class were to emerge. To sum up, the counter-argument of the “institutional” hypothesis 
of economics growth is that the effect of geography is only indirect through institutions and that 
after accounting for institutions, the effect of geography on economic growth should vanish. 5 
Also quite relevant, the “new geography” approach developed by Krugman and Venables 
(1995). While acknowledging the role of physical geography, it stresses the importance of 
“second-nature” geography with factors like increasing returns to scale, agglomeration 
economies, transportation costs and product differentiation; all these may result in stable 
institutions that are essential for production and trade promoting economic growth.   
On the empirical side, there is a large literature which offers results supporting the own 
purported hypothesis on the role of geography and institutions and disproving the other. Simple 
OLS regression of variables like the share of tropical climate areas, landlocked dummy, distance 
to “core” economic areas and the share of natural resources in exports on GDP per capita by 
Sachs and Warner (1997), Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs (1999) were found to be positive and 
                                                          
5 See Przeworksi (2004) and Lorenz et al. (2005) for more discussion on the debate.  
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significant. Other variables that were used to reflect geography were malaria intensity, the 
frequency of frost and latitude to proxy for tropical zone prevalence by Masters and McMillan 
(2001), McArthur and Sachs (2001), and Sachs (2003). Recently, Dell et al. (2012) used 
temperature and precipitation, while McCord and Sachs (2013) used average distance to port, 
malaria ecology index, and quality-adjusted land per capita to estimate the effect of geography 
on economic growth. Their results show positive and significant effects of geography on growth. 
For the case of within regions and countries, Nunn and Puga (2009) used terrain ruggedness in 
Africa to explain their economic growth problems, while Sachs et al. (2002) used distance to 
ports and the average slope of the land to explain economic growth in China’s provinces.  
In contrast to these findings pertaining to the role of geography, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) include latitude in their analysis of the “institutions” hypothesis and do not find 
any significant effect of geography on growth. Easterly and Levine (2003) use various measures 
of resource endowments and find that without institutions as a control variable endowments are 
positive and significant; however, once institutions are included in the analysis, their significance 
vanishes. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) confirm that result using distance to the 
equator as a geography variable. We test this hypothesis using our dataset and regress the GDP 
per capita growth on elevation heterogeneity and land size, and we find that without any controls 
and with controls we use in our estimations, neither elevation nor land size variables are 
significant in any specification.   
Interestingly, country size and elevation – our instrumental variables of interest in this 
paper – are the least frequently used variables in the economic growth literature to capture 
geography. They are taken into account indirectly in the case of distance to ports since average 
distances will be larger for larger countries, and with the more rugged terrain. As we have seen, 
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terrain ruggedness and the average slope of the land both have been directly analyzed only 
within the African continent and China’s provinces. Average elevation was included by Sachs et 
al. (2002) in their study of China, but it was never found to be significant.  
Summarizing, even though there is a potential direct effect of geography on economic 
growth, this relationship is questionable on a variety of grounds. First, geography may affect the 
diversity or composition of economic activity as opposed to the level of economic activity itself. 
People living in mountainous areas may not be able to grow certain crops, but they do have other 
economic activities that are not available to low-landers. The world offers sufficiently many 
examples of countries with no geographic advantages which have emerged as economic powers 
arguably as a consequence of strong, efficient institutions and the high-quality human capital 
such as Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, etc. Second, geography being exogenous-- in other 
words, economic growth does not affect geography--, can affect economic growth through other 
channels like trade, institutions, and infrastructure, but each of these can be controlled for more 
or less successfully since none of them are fully unobserved. In summary, if these considerations 
are valid, using geography as an instrument for fiscal decentralization in explaining growth can 
be defended. 
3.3 Indirect effect of Geography on Economic Growth through Fiscal Decentralization. 
It is arguable that historically people who live in different elevations, climates and, etc., 
become different over time in terms of languages, customs, and preferences. And they do not 
have to be necessarily ethnically different, because the same ethnic group in a country can have 
several dialects and have substantially different preferences in food and customs, and generally 
develop different cultural characteristics like in the cases of China and India. This differentiation 
of preferences over time would be expected to affect the structure of governance because even if 
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a country starts with centralized government, tensions between heterogeneous groups will arise 
due to different utility levels from same public goods provided; this, in turn, will lead to push for 
more decentralized governance. Moreover, differences in tastes and preferences developed 
through centuries due to diversity in geographic conditions tend to persist through the 
assimilation of newly immigrated residents into the local culture and acceptance of the existing 
set of preferences.  
Getting back to the question of the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
we can hypothesize that geography is likely to lead to increases in preference heterogeneity and 
this eventually result in higher levels of fiscal decentralization. In turn, fiscal decentralization 
can result in different rates of economic growth through the variety of mechanisms discussed 
above. Therefore, the effect of geography on economic growth is indirect and through fiscal 
decentralization, supporting the validity of geography as an instrument.   
4. Data 
We construct a comprehensive panel (time-series cross-country) dataset for over 100 
countries for the period of 1981-2012, although the sample varies considerably depending on 
specification and variables used due to differing availability of data of variables used. Most of 
the variables were extracted from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), while 
fiscal decentralization variables are from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 
complemented using OECD databases. The variable description and sources are listed in 
Appendix A (table 24A) in more detail. We average the values for five year periods to smooth 
the data over the macro-economic cycle and also to allow us to focus on the long run effects. The 
summary statistics of main variables are can be found in table 16A in Appendix A. 
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4.1 Measuring Fiscal Decentralization 
We use two conventional and most frequently used measures: (1) the ratio of total 
subnational revenues to general government revenues and (2) ratio of total subnational 
expenditure to general government expenditures calculated using IMF GFS data. For the general 
government expenditure we use consolidated or budgetary central, regional, state and local 
government level data. Although there are potential flaws associated with those two measures 
which have been discussed above, as pointed out by Letelier (2005), while there are some 
missing values on the Fiscal Decentralization information from GFS, there is no evidence of a 
systematic measurement error across countries. Therefore, regression results should not be 
affected as long as the sample is large enough, which it is in this case.   
Moreover, we hypothesize that the impact of expenditure decentralization versus revenue 
decentralization is partially different and they capture different dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization. Frequently, expenditure decentralization is associated with central 
administration and therefore does not always imply effective decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Timofeev, 2010). On the other hand, revenue decentralization focuses more on minimizing 
the distortions from taxes and usually harder to achieve politically. On top of that, they obviously 
can diverge due to the possibility of borrowing, and different sub-national borrowing rules across 
countries warrant different levels of decentralization. While both measures of decentralization 
usually go hand in hand, using both measures in one equation may lead to multi-collinearity 
issues. Therefore, since they have differing mechanisms of impact, we use two separate 
estimations for both.  
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4.2 Measuring Geography 
We measure geography in two dimensions: First, using the Geographic Fragmentation 
Index (GFI), previously developed by Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez and Yedgenov 
(2017); and the country size.6  
The data for GFI is acquired from NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and 
Information System (EOSDIS) hosted by The Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University. The data are available for the year 1990, 1995, 2000 
and 2010. Since there is low variation in GFI over time, to address the missing values for 1981-
1985, it is assumed to be same as 1986-1990, while data for 2001-2005 is assumed to be same as 
2006-2010. 
The index reflects the weighted probability that two individuals taken at random in the 
country do not live in similar altitude zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average 
distance between altitudes. Thus the index is simply calculated as  
1 − ∑ ∑ (wij
ni
N
)
2
N
i=1
J
j=1           (1) 
where 
ni
N
 is the share of the population by elevation and wij measures the distance between 
altitude i and altitude j. This measure goes from zero, which corresponds to a case where all the 
population is settled in the same altitude zone, to one which corresponds to the implausible case 
where each lives in a different altitude. In general, geographical fragmentation will increase with 
the number of altitude-zones and an equal weights for each group.7 Figure 2 shows the 
                                                          
6 Actually, this second variable is adjusted country size.  Given that there is a correlation between the GFI and the 
country size variable, we regress the GFI on country size and use the residuals of these in the regressions. 
7 The methodology applied for the index is similar to the one applied by Lora et. al. (2003) for geographical zones and 
that applied by Hudson (1972) for population.  
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geographical fragmentation index in 1990 ranked from countries that are less fragmented (i.e. 
Belarus, Paraguay) to countries that show high levels of geographical fragmentation (i.e. 
Colombia, China, or Switzerland).  
 
Figure 2 Global Map of Geographical Fragmentation Index (Own Calculation for 1990)8 
4.3 Basic equation specifications  
For estimating the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, we follow the 
conventional neoclassical economic growth specification based on Barro (1990), Mankiw et al. 
(1992), and Davoodi and Zou (1998). Specifically, we control for a log of initial GDP per capita 
to account for convergence, population growth, human capital,9 openness to international trade, 
democratic governance and quality of institutions,10 ethnolinguistic fractionalization and add 
regional and time dummies. 
                                                          
8
 The Geographic Fragmentation Index in the figure varies from 0 to 100 (probability * 100), with 100 being most 
fragmented geographic elevation (all individuals living in different altitude), while 0 is for least fragmentation of 
elevation (all individuals living in the same altitude). Darker color indicates higher fragmentation.  
9 Human capital is proxied by infant mortality. Although less than perfect this variable allows to have the most 
complete panel data set for the time span we use. 
10 Here we use the political rights from Freedom House. 
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The estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is done in two 
stages: 
First stage:                                        FDit = α0 + γXit + δZit + εit      (2) 
Second stage:                                   GDPpcgrit = ρ0 + θXit + σFD̂it
̇ + uit       (3) 
where FDit is the measure of fiscal decentralization, while FD̂it is the predicted values from first 
stage equation, 
         GDPpcgrit is the growth in GDP per capita, our measure of economic growth, 
          Xit is the set of control variables discussed, 
          Zit is the set of country specific geography instrumental variables, namely GFI and 
country size.  
The coefficient σ is the primary interest since it represents the exogenous causal effect of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth. The coefficient value represents the percentage point 
change in GDP per capita growth when the share of subnational government in total government 
revenue or expenditure is changed by one percentage point.  
5. Estimation method 
As explained in previous sections, there is a reason to believe that naïve estimates of the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth are biased due to reverse causality. 
Conceptually, it is fairly difficult to predict the direction of the bias. On the one hand, if 
economic growth leads to fiscal decentralization as well, a simple OLS regression will over-
estimate the true impact. On the other hand, there might be unobserved factors such as the 
quality of government officials that are different in developed versus developing countries that 
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undermine the real causal impact of fiscal decentralization, and simple OLS estimate will under-
estimate the true impact.  
Therefore, to estimate the exogenous effect of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth, we use the instrumental variable (IV) approach. To address the endogeneity problem, we 
use geography as an instrument, which is exogenous to economic growth and other factors and 
which we claim based on economic logic and statistical tests does not directly affect economic 
growth after controlling for the role of institutions.  
The estimation is performed in two stages. In the first stage, we regress fiscal 
decentralization on geography and other exogenous variables and obtain from the estimated 
equation the predicted values for fiscal decentralization. In the second stage, we regress 
economic growth on the predicted values for fiscal decentralization from the first stage along 
with other exogenous control variables. As a result of the first stage, we can extract the 
exogenous variation in fiscal decentralization, removing its endogenous component; in this 
manner, we can estimate the causal exogenous effect of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth,11 with corrected standard errors.12 Low time variance of geography presents a problem 
when using panel estimation methods that imply differencing of the data over time like fixed 
effect or GMM approach. Therefore, we will use conventional pooled OLS with regional and 
time specific dummy variables; random effects estimation results will be provided for robustness 
checks. 
                                                          
11 See Wooldridge (2012) for more details. 
12 Statistical package program STATA corrects the standard errors automatically through command ivregress. 
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6. Results 
6.1 Main results of simple and IV OLS. 
We first report the results of the simple OLS regression with naïve estimates in table 2. 
According to our estimates, we find a positive and significant impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth for both measures of fiscal decentralization. In other words, we find that a ten 
percentage point increase in the share of sub-national government expenditure in total 
government expenditure is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.2 percentage 
points. At the same time, we find that a ten percentage point increase in the share of sub-national 
government revenue in total government revenue is expected to increase the GDP per capita 
growth by 0.31 percentage points. Overall, these findings support the side of the literature that 
find a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Yilmaz, 1999; Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Breuss and Eller, 2004; Iimi, 2005). More specifically, these 
findings are relatively close to previous comparable findings of 0.15 for developed countries in 
expenditure decentralization (Thiessen, 2003), although considerably lower than 0.6 percentage 
points reported by Iimi (2005) for a sample of both developed and developing countries. This 
supports the argument that the impact of expenditure decentralization is at least partially 
independent of the impact of revenue decentralization, with the impact of revenue 
decentralization larger by 50%. We also find that infant mortality is negatively associated with 
economic growth, while trade openness increases economic growth significantly.  
Next, we present the results of instrumental variable OLS estimation in table 3. We report 
both fist stage regression results in columns 1 and 3, and second stage results in columns 2 and 4. 
First of all, we find that in both expenditure and revenue decentralization cases the instruments 
are highly significant and both are positive as expected. These results are in line with Canavire-
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Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez and Yedgenov (2017) findings and provide similar evidence that 
GFI and land size are important determinants of fiscal decentralization.  
Table 2 Simple OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
      
Expenditure Decentralization 0.020*  
(0.012)  
Revenue Decentralization  0.031*** 
 (0.012) 
Log of Initial GDP per capita -2.045*** -2.171*** 
(0.455) (0.403) 
Population growth (WDI) -61.358** -63.259** 
(23.667) (25.359) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.030*** -0.030*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.008** 0.009** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.095 -0.049 
(0.101) (0.093) 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
(AL) 
0.174 -0.596 
(0.632) (0.594) 
Constant 20.681*** 21.994*** 
(4.357) (3.960) 
Regional dummies YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES 
Observations 285 301 
R-squared 0.315 0.391 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Moreover, since we use country clustered standard errors, we refer to Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic, which is 14 in the case of expenditure decentralization and 15.6 in the case of 
revenue decentralization. Based on Stock and Yogo’s rule of thumb, both are higher than the 
critical F test value at 5% significant level so we can reject that the instruments are weak in both 
expenditure and revenue regression cases (Stock and Yogo, 2005). This is a partial evidence that 
instruments are strong. 
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Table 3 IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
          
Expenditure Decentralization  0.042**   
 (0.021)   
Revenue Decentralization    0.041** 
   (0.020) 
Geographic Fragmentation 
Index (GFI) 
1.222***  1.255**  
(0.451)  (0.564)  
Log Country Size 4.496***  4.587***  
(1.001)  (1.168)  
Log of Initial GDP per capita 11.775*** -2.379*** 8.287** -2.293*** 
(3.099) (0.478) (3.262) (0.404) 
Population growth (WDI) -270.872 -58.663** -323.854* -60.958** 
(178.594) (24.577) (163.415) (24.842) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.116** -0.034*** 0.026 -0.031*** 
(0.054) (0.008) (0.060) (0.007) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.014 0.010*** -0.046 0.010** 
(0.044) (0.004) (0.052) (0.004) 
Political Rights (FH) -1.320 -0.072 -0.527 -0.052 
(0.886) (0.098) (1.034) (0.088) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization (AL) 
1.723 0.069 10.468 -0.753 
(8.304) (0.662) (11.122) (0.648) 
Constant -129.81*** 23.181*** -105.7*** 22.924*** 
(30.825) (4.386) (28.580) (3.855) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 288 285 304 301 
R-squared 0.569 0.301 0.516 0.388 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In the second stage regressions in table 3, we find highly significant and positive impact 
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth for both measures of decentralization. In other 
words, we find that a ten percentage point increase in the share of sub-national government 
expenditure in total government expenditure is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth 
by 0.42 percentage points. At the same time, we find that a ten percentage point increase in the 
share of sub-national government revenue in total government revenue is expected to increase 
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the GDP per capita growth by 0.41 percentage points. These estimates are considerably larger 
than the naïve estimates reported in table 2, with expenditure decentralization impact 100% 
larger while revenue decentralization estimate is 50% larger.  
Again, these findings support the side of the literature that find a positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth and more specifically, these coefficients are significantly 
smaller than the average of 0.6 reported in studies that report a positive impact for both 
developed and developing countries (Iimi, 2005), as well as studies that were done within-
country that usually report a coefficient above 1.  
We again observe the expected results for the control variables. We find population 
growth highly significant and negative as most of the previous literature reports, while infant 
mortality is also highly significant and negative as expected. We also find expected the positive 
and significant impact of trade openness on economic growth. The rest of the control variables 
are insignificant. 
6.2 Heterogeneous impact of Fiscal Decentralization. 
As was discussed in the previous sections, less developed countries tend to have lower 
degrees of fiscal decentralization. In part, this difference may be due to overall readiness of more 
developed countries to perform more effective decentralization reform due to higher availability 
of government resources in terms of political will or availability of high-quality government 
officials, or other institutional features of a country. Therefore, the impact of fiscal 
decentralization might be different for developed versus developing countries. Since it is 
practically impossible to control for these features, we divide the sample into two groups of 
countries – developed versus developing (OECD vs Non-OECD). Ideally, we would like to 
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conduct a quintile effect analysis. However, the sample size is too low for each quintile to make 
any reliable conclusions.  
Table 4 presents the IV OLS estimation of economic growth equation for OECD 
countries. In the first stage, country size is still highly significant and positive, while GFI loses 
the significant at 10% confidence level. However, joint significance of the instruments still 
holds. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is at 11.6 for expenditure decentralization and is 
acceptable within 15% confidence level according to Stock-Yogo classification. However, the F 
statistic falls to 3.3 in the case of revenue decentralization, and leads to suspicion of the weak 
instrumental variable, although the Cragg-Donald F statistic is above 11.6.  
When we observe the second stage results, we find that the impact of both expenditure 
and revenue decentralization are still significant and positive. However, the magnitude of the 
impact changed for both. In the case of expenditure decentralization, we find that a ten 
percentage point increase in the share of sub-national government expenditure in total 
government expenditure is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.25 percentage 
points, which is 40% lower than the magnitude found in the full sample of countries.  
In contrast, the impact of revenue decentralization is larger, and we find that a ten 
percentage point increase in the share of sub-national government revenue in total government 
revenue is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.52 percentage points, which is 
approximately 27% larger in magnitude compared to full sample. However, the revenue 
decentralization estimates should be considered with caution due to suspicion of the weak 
instrumental variable.  
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Compared to previous literature, for the sample of developed countries, the results are 
larger than average of 0.12-0.15 percentage points reported in similar studies (Thiessen, 2003). 
However, for developing countries, the coefficients are insignificant and support another strand 
of literature (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
Table 4 IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth - OECD 
sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
 0.025**   
 (0.010)   
Revenue Decentralization    0.052** 
   (0.023) 
Geographic Fragmentation 
Index (GFI) 
1.038  0.832  
(0.697)  (0.659)  
Log Country Size 5.287***  3.389**  
(1.405)  (1.372)  
Log of Initial GDP per 
capita 
16.646** -2.173*** 21.511*** -3.435*** 
(7.256) (0.384) (5.809) (0.559) 
Population growth (WDI) 281.977 -2.701 210.450 4.221 
(356.445) (28.353) (326.024) (25.579) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -1.633*** -0.013 -1.205* -0.096 
(0.431) (0.117) (0.667) (0.087) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.062 0.007** -0.018 0.011*** 
(0.069) (0.003) (0.076) (0.004) 
Political Rights (FH) 3.044*** -0.503 1.662 -0.291 
(0.962) (0.355) (1.340) (0.273) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization (AL) 
22.576** -1.283*** 34.888** -2.255** 
(9.193) (0.472) (13.035) (1.060) 
Constant -172.346** 22.434*** -217.512*** 34.928*** 
(76.748) (4.476) (62.079) (5.238) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 140 138 149 147 
R-squared 0.672 0.496 0.692 0.482 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5 IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth - Non-
OECD sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expenditure 
Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage 
Second 
Stage First Stage 
Second 
Stage 
          
Expenditure Decentralization  0.050   
 (0.032)   
Revenue Decentralization    0.047 
   (0.032) 
Geographic Fragmentation 
Index (GFI) 
2.530***  2.292***  
(0.316)  (0.407)  
Log Country Size 5.970***  5.818***  
(0.711)  (0.840)  
Log of Initial GDP per capita 2.936 -1.596** 3.167 -1.468** 
(2.947) (0.636) (2.879) (0.600) 
Population growth (WDI) -514.699*** -39.579 -386.561** -41.115 
(188.211) (31.846) (191.286) (34.272) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.099** -0.025*** 0.056 -0.021** 
(0.043) (0.010) (0.048) (0.009) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.007 0.013 -0.021 0.010 
(0.035) (0.009) (0.041) (0.010) 
Political Rights (FH) -1.300** -0.222* -0.500 -0.163 
(0.640) (0.134) (0.838) (0.112) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization (AL) 
-16.973** 0.971 -15.486* 0.177 
(7.582) (1.347) (8.814) (1.410) 
Constant -97.461*** 15.570*** -99.017*** 14.786*** 
(26.253) (5.668) (23.404) (5.516) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 148 147 155 154 
R-squared 0.736 0.411 0.722 0.494 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 5 presents the same results for developing or non-OECD countries sample. First of 
all, we observe that both GFI and country size are highly significant and positive, as in full 
sample, and the Wald F-statistic is 23 and 35 for expenditure and revenue IV estimations 
respectively, way above the 10% confidence level and strong evidence of non-weak IV. It can be 
expected that the impact of GFI is lower for developed countries because developed countries 
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have better communicational infrastructure that undermines the impact of geographical features 
within a country compared to developing countries. Also, the magnitude of the impact of both 
GFI and size is larger for developing countries compared to developed countries.  
When we observe the second stage of IV OLS results in columns 2 and 4, we find that the 
impact of both expenditure and revenue decentralization is insignificant at 10% confidence level. 
On the other hand, both are positive and technically significant at 14% confidence level. We can 
make a conclusion that ten percentage point increase in share of sub-national government 
expenditure in total government expenditure is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth 
by 0.5 percentage points, while ten percentage point increase in share of sub-national 
government revenue in total government revenue is expected to increase the GDP per capita 
growth by 0.47 percentage points. The impact of expenditure decentralization is larger than in 
developing countries, while the impact of revenue decentralization is smaller but close. These 
coefficients support another strand of literature which doesn’t find a significant impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
One other possibility that might explain the disparity between developed and developing 
countries is the potential non-linear impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. It has 
been hypothesized before that this relationship might be in the form of inverse U shape, which 
implies potential inflection point of maximum impact on economic growth (Thiessen, 2003). In 
other words, the impact of fiscal decentralization may be positive at lower levels of fiscal 
decentralization, and after peaking out may be detrimental to economic growth at higher levels 
of fiscal decentralization. One possible justification of such relationship lies in the theory of 
government functions, where the central government is expectedly more efficient in functions 
that have spillover effects such as stabilization and redistribution, while subnational governments 
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are more efficient in functions that have low or no spillover effect. Increasing fiscal 
decentralization to extreme levels may lead to lower efficiency of the government overall due to 
inefficient spillovers and free-rider effect across jurisdictions.  
Since developed countries are on average more decentralized, they might be closer to 
inflection point compared to developing countries. Our finding suggests that they are still at 
positive marginal impact side of this potential curve. On the other hand, developing countries 
have a high variation in the degree of decentralization, and it is difficult to hypothesize their 
position on this curve, which partially might explain the insignificant result we find.   
6.2 Robustness check 
We provide several robustness checks of the main results presented here.  
First, while we cannot perform fixed effect estimations, to exploit the panel data at hand, 
we estimate random effects model. As can be seen in table 17A in the Appendix A, the results of 
random effect estimation show approximately the same coefficients for the impact of fiscal 
decentralization as the simple OLS regression. The same can be said for the coefficients in IV 
random effect estimation and IV OLS results (table 18A).  
Second, to address partially the potential non-linear nature of the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth raised in the previous section, we employ different 
functional form for the GDP per capita growth, more specifically the log version which is 
consistent with possible inverse U shape. We again find that the GFI and land size are non-weak 
and valid instruments in the first stage, and fiscal decentralization has a significant impact on 
economic growth for developed countries (table 19A), although the significance for the whole 
sample of countries vanishes. 
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Third, we explore the joint impact of fiscal decentralization variables. While frequently 
the expenditure and revenue decentralization go hand in hand, they address and measure 
fundamentally different aspects of fiscal decentralization and capture different mechanisms of 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 
2010). The results partially confirm that when we include the other fiscal decentralization 
measure in the first and second stage, we find that the other fiscal decentralization measure is 
highly significant in the first stage, while in the second stage none of the fiscal decentralization 
measures are significant (table 20A). The result suggests that overall the fiscal decentralization 
efforts go hand in hand, and when a country decides to decentralize, they decentralize both 
expenditure and revenue components of the budget. At the same time, due to high correlation, 
the second stage result suffer from multicollinearity and don’t yield any meaningful results. In 
other words, while they are highly correlated, it makes sense to study them separately to identify 
the separate mechanism through which fiscal decentralization affects economic growth. 
Fourth, we test the sensitivity of the result to a different period of averaging to account 
for possible business cycles that are longer than five years and try ten year averaging of all 
variables. This obviously decreases the sample size, but it is encouraging to see the results still 
stand. We find that again the GFI and land size are valid and strong in the first stage, and fiscal 
decentralization measures have a significant impact on economic growth for all samples of 
countries (table 21A). In fact, compared to main results, the magnitudes of the impact are larger 
by approximately 15-20%.  
Finally, we look at the validity and strength of the instrument separately. We argue that 
both GFI and land size jointly determine the fiscal decentralization in the first stage, and should 
be used jointly as instruments. As we can see, when we use these instruments separately, GFI is 
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not significant in the first stage (table 22A), and the land size is usually significant in the first 
stage (table 23A). However, none of the fiscal decentralization measures are significant in the 
second stage. Therefore, we can conclude that GFI capture an important mechanism through 
which the causal impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is identified.  
7. Conclusion 
The question of the causal impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has been 
one of the most researched issues in the literature on fiscal federalism, especially in light of most 
governments’ effort to start or further decentralize the fiscal system. However, a general glance 
at this vast literature reveals that practically all the previous papers are flawed because they 
suffer from a fundamental identification problem. The basic identification problem arises from 
the presence of the so called “reverse causality” or “simultaneity,” where fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth simultaneously affect (cause) each other. Any estimation of the causal 
impact of fiscal decentralization without accounting for these identification issues will be flawed 
and cannot be truly reliable, let alone be the basis for policy recommendations.  
In this paper, we claim that the geography measured using Geographic Fragmentation 
Index (GFI) and country size is highly correlated with fiscal decentralization and is neither 
directly nor indirectly correlated with economic growth except through fiscal decentralization. 
Measuring it in several dimensions explained in previous sections, we make the case that 
geography is indeed highly correlated with fiscal decentralization. The basic idea behind this 
relationship is that geographic conditions like significant variations in elevation and country size 
have long influenced the degree of heterogeneity in tastes and preferences for local and regional 
public goods and services in countries around the world. The persistence of heterogeneity in 
demand for public services eventually leads to heightened demand for fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
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decentralization. Even though the effect of geography can be weakened by migration, the overall 
effect is likely to endure due to the assimilation of newcomers. 
Also, we claim that geography is exogenous to economic growth; that is, that economic 
growth does not affect geography. On the other hand, geography can very well be directly 
correlated with economic growth as well as indirectly through fiscal decentralization itself or 
other venues. Even though certain particular dimensions of geography other than elevation 
heterogeneity can play a direct role in economic growth, we argue that by controlling for the role 
of institutions, the role of geography can be neutralized or eliminated, as has been shown by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2003). Therefore, we claim 
that geography can be used as a strong and reliable instrument for the endogenous fiscal 
decentralization in estimating the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.  
In the empirical analysis, we find that both geography measures being proposed are 
strong and valid as instruments for fiscal decentralization in the first stage of 2SLS approach. 
Moreover, we find that fiscal decentralization measured as a share of expenditure or revenue of 
subnational government in total general government expenditure or revenue has a significant 
positive impact on economic growth, especially in the case of developed countries. Our findings 
show that a ten percent increase in the share of subnational expenditure in total general 
government expenditures will increase GDP per capita growth by 0.42 percentage points, while a 
ten percent increase in the share of subnational revenue in total general government revenue will 
increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.41 percentage points. Overall, these findings support 
the side of the literature that find a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
(Yilmaz, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Breuss and Eller, 2004; Iimi, 2005). 
More specifically, these coefficients are significantly smaller than the average of 0.6 reported in 
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studies that report positive impact for both developed and developing countries (Iimi, 2005), and 
even studies that are done within-country that usually report coefficient above 1.  
On the other hand, for the sample of developed countries, the results are still statically 
significant with the magnitudes for expenditure and revenue decentralization coefficient of 0.25 
and 0.52, respectively, which is positive and larger than average of 0.12-0.15 percentage points 
reported in similar studies (Thiessen, 2003). However, for developing countries, the coefficients 
are not significant at the 10 percent confidence level anymore which supports another strand of 
literature (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
Lack of time variance in our instrumental variables limits the scope of empirical 
investigation we can perform, particularly use of fixed effect methods, however, we claim that 
having a valid and strong instrumental variable not only solves endogeneity stemming from 
reverse causality, but also from omitted variable bias. Therefore, our results stand on the firm 
empirical ground, even if we can’t control for unobserved fixed effects over time that are usually 
controlled for in cross-country studies.  
Finally, it is important to note that we are not claiming to give a definitive answer to the 
causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, this is a complex 
relationship affected by not only endogeneity, but also variable definitions and measurement 
errors among others, and requires further elaborate empirical investigations. We do claim that 
this essay does add significant insight to understanding the overall positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth, especially for different groups of countries and we hope 
that it will encourage further research in this important policy area. 
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CHAPTER 2. TAX STRUCTURE AND OUTPUT VOLATILITY: CROSS-COUNTRY 
EVIDENCE  
1. Introduction 
In the light of recent economic turmoil that has affected much of the world in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, the ability of governments to stabilize their economies stands 
out more than ever as one of the key functions of government early identified by Musgrave 
(1959). Because of the deleterious impacts on investments in capital and technology and on 
employment, economic instability retards economic growth and leads to increases in income 
inequality. Therefore, to promote economic growth and more evenly distributed prosperity, it is 
clear that one of the main roles that government needs to perform is the stabilization of the 
economy, be it through institutional, economic or more narrowly, fiscal and budgetary methods. 
The focus of this essay is on the latter. More specifically, the focus is on the role tax structure 
can pay on reducing output volatility in the economy.  
It has long been argued that tax structure, comprised of tax bases, marginal, average, and 
statutory tax rates, the progressivity of various taxes, and the tax mix can have an important role 
in reducing output volatility via the implied built in automatic stabilizing features of the tax 
system. The best well-known example of this is the presence of progressivity of income taxes 
that tends to act as an automatic stabilizer by freeing resources to the private economy and 
households during a recession because lower incomes caused by a recession decrease taxable 
incomes into lower tax brackets lowering tax bills. The reverse happens during economic 
upturns. Moreover, since corporate income taxes are based on profit rather than revenue, and 
profits tend to fall faster than revenue during recessions, corporations end up paying much fewer 
taxes for relatively lower decreases in production during economic downturns. There are, of 
course, many other channels through which tax structures tend to stabilize the economy and in 
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the aggregate then can be sizable. For example, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) estimated that in 
the US individual federal taxes offset perhaps as much as 8 percent of initial shocks to GDP.  
There have been some studies that have researched this relationship between tax structure 
and economic volatility, which will be reviewed in more detail further below. However, the 
majority of those studies have been limited by measurement and sample size issues. While some 
studies have focused on a limited sample of countries like only OECD, EU or emerging 
countries, other studies limited the scope of tax structure by focusing on only certain aspects of 
the tax structure. This essay contributes to the literature in several important ways.  
First, we use a rich dataset on tax structure variables which includes both developed and 
developing countries. Most of the previous studies in the literature use only OECD data due to 
availability and overall higher quality of data entry. However, this restricts the sample of 
countries and prevents any comparison between developed and developing countries. Our dataset 
includes over 100 countries from 1981 to 2014, which is a significant expansion of the data that 
has been used before.  
Second, we use comprehensive measure of structural progressivity based on average and 
marginal PIT rates at different points of the income distribution developed by Sabirianova-Peter 
et al. (2010), which we updated through 2014 as part of the World Tax Indicators (WTI) project 
at the International Center for Public Policy (ICePP) at Georgia State University. Unlike 
previous measures of progressivity of tax structure, our measure is highly comparable and 
unprecedented in coverage. Moreover, it includes important tax structure features such as tax 
brackets, statutory rates, basic allowances, tax credits, which had not been fully used before.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature by exploring the interaction effects of tax structure 
and different measures of government size. The basic hypothesis being that the degree of impact 
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of automatic stabilizers are dependent on scale of government’s reach in the economy. This is 
important because as is well known there are significant differences in government size between 
developed and developing countries. 
The rest of this essay is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework of mechanisms of the impact. 
Section 4 outlines the data, measurement, and methodology. Section 5 summarizes the empirical 
results, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
The literature on output volatility can be divided according to the way automatic and 
discretionary stabilizers (and destabilizers) of output are accounted for. One strand of the 
literature focuses on the impact of the income tax schedule progressivity, while another strand 
emphasizes the role of government size and its composition. 
2.1 Theoretical literature 
The role of progressivity of the tax schedule in the output volatility has been studied 
mainly using real business cycle (RBC) models. Guo and Lansing (1999) explored the role of 
income tax schedules in one-sector real business cycle (RBC) model. They concluded that when 
schedules become more progressive, saddle path stability is more likely even for an economy 
with strong, increasing returns. And when it becomes regressive, the economy is more 
susceptible to indeterminacy. Christiano and Harrison (1999) obtain the same finding that 
progressive taxation on agents’ labor effort is an automatic stabilizer within the endogenous 
growth version of one-sector RBC model. Guo and Harrison (2001) extended the idea to a two-
sector real business cycle model and concluded that results become dependent on the presence of 
investment externality factors. With strong investment externalities, a regressive tax schedule 
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can stabilize the economy against belief-driven fluctuations because the consumption and price 
effects of a regressive taxation system outweigh its investment effects. On the other hand, 
without investment externalities, regressive tax schedules can destabilize the economy by 
generating belief-driven fluctuations, while progressive tax schedules that act to reduce the 
higher returns from belief-driven labor and investment spurts can prevent agents’ expectations 
from becoming self-fulfilling.  
After analyzing the role of productive government spending (under balanced budget) in 
affecting macroeconomic stability within one-sector RBC models (Guo and Harrison 2004, 
2008), Chen and Guo (2013) apply this extension to the progressive taxation context. They 
conclude that under certain conditions pertaining the labor share, the productivity of government 
spending and tax progressivity parameters, a regressive tax system can be stabilizing. 
Alternatively, Mino and Nakamoto (2008) reexamined the stabilization effect of progressive 
income taxation in a neoclassical growth model with the presence of heterogeneous agents under 
balanced-budget discipline. Their main finding is that in the presence of heterogeneous agents 
with different preferences, the stabilizing power of progressive income taxation – widely 
demonstrated in representative-agent models – may not always be effective. Finally, Moldovan 
(2010) shows that more progressive income taxes lead to lower volatility of output among other 
factors by affecting after-hour wage rate and thereby hours worked and consumption via wealth 
and substitution effect in the context of the neoclassical growth model with monopolistic 
competition.  
Another strand of the theoretical literature is focused on the effect of government size, 
usually measured in terms of revenue or expenditure share in GDP, on output volatility. Gali 
(1994) used a one-sector RBC model with income taxes and government purchases. By 
  
 
43 
 
calibrating the model with stylized features of the postwar U.S. economy, he finds that for most 
specifications, government purchases are stabilizing, while income taxes are destabilizing. 
However, Guo and Harrison (2006) show that if the preferences are assumed to be convex unlike 
in Gali (1994), the conclusion is reversed: government purchases become destabilizing. In this 
same regard, Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2008) show that the introduction of rule-of-thumb 
consumers into a New Keynesian model generates a negative relationship between government 
size and output volatility.  
Finally, Andres and Domenech (2006) analyze output volatility using a dynamic general 
equilibrium (DGE) model with nominal and real rigidities. Their paper analyzes the effect of the 
tax structure on the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization induced by technological 
shocks. The model is calibrated to the features of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries and some features of the US. In contrast to previous RBC model studies, these authors 
find that an economy with distortionary taxation yields lower volatility of output than an 
economy with lump-sum taxes. Finally, Posch (2011) investigated the link between taxes and 
output volatility using a stochastic neoclassical model to demonstrate the effect of distortive 
taxes on the variability of macro aggregates. In his model, households in a general equilibrium 
setting affect the short-run dynamics of the output growth rate by their consumption-saving 
decisions, while taxes on income, wealth, consumption expenditure and investment expenditure 
affect the growth rate in the short-run directly as well as indirectly via capital accumulation. 
While stressing that the second moment is necessary to uncover tax effects on output volatility, 
he concluded that income taxes along with a tax on investment decrease output volatility, while a 
tax on consumption has no effect.  
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2.2 Empirical literature 
Regarding progressivity of tax system, Weller and Rao (2010) analyzed the role of 
personal income tax progressivity measured by the top marginal tax rate, average tax rate and the 
median tax rate on volatility in 29 emerging countries over the period 1981 to 2002 with the data 
averaged over five-year periods. In their multivariate OLS analysis, they conclude that 
progressive tax policy has no short-run effects, but that it does have a small negative long-run 
effect on stability. In other words, they conclude that on average an increase of one standard 
deviation of the median tax rate, for instance, results in an 8.5% reduction in economic stability. 
Finally, they also include VAT along with the progressivity variables and conclude that the 
potential benefit of progressive tax policy may be reduced by the presence of the VAT, while 
higher progressivity is associated with less economic stability in the short-run. Also, Attinasi et 
al. (2011) evaluated the relationship between personal income tax progressivity and output 
volatility for 30 OECD countries over the period 1982-2009. They define the personal income 
tax progressivity following Arnold (2008) using an index between zero and one including both 
marginal and average tax rates.13 Applying OLS and accounting for the endogeneity of 
government size (measure by the revenue share in GDP), they conclude that higher progressivity 
significantly decreases output volatility.  
On the issue of the impact of government size on output volatility, along with the 
theoretical contribution, Gali (1994) investigates this relationship in 22 OECD countries over the 
period 1960-1990. The basic finding is that government purchases are negatively associated with 
output volatility: economies with larger governments experience milder economic fluctuations 
by comparison to economies with smaller size governments. Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a 
                                                          
13 The index is equal to [1 – (100 – marginal tax rate)/(100 – average tax rate)]. 
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sample of OECD countries and the US states and conclude that government size measured as 
government expenditure as a % of GDP is strongly and negatively correlated with output 
volatility. Moreover, they instrument government size using area and distance to major trade 
partners, GDP per capita, dependency ratio, urbanization rate, total GDP and two political 
dummies for political systems and find an even stronger negative impact. Martinez-Mongay and 
Sekkat (2005) confirm the same conclusion using an OECD sample over the period 1960-2000, 
adding that the relationship is not linear and that composition effects matter. They argue that 
distortionary taxes like taxes on labor and capital are destabilizing. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 
(2003) apply a similar analysis on EU countries over the period 1970-1999 and also find a 
stabilizing effect of government size measured both as the revenue and expenditure shares of 
GDP, although they argue that at high levels of expenditure (above 38 percent) the relationship is 
reversed. Finally, Debrun et al. (2008) point out the decreasing role of the stabilizing effect of 
government size after 1990 by dividing the sample by time periods. These authors also confirm 
the decreasing impact on stability at higher levels of government expenditure as a share of GDP. 
Finally, in regards to government size components, Fatás and Mihov (2001) include both 
direct and indirect taxes as an alternative measure of government size and find a consistent 
negative impact of direct taxes and no significant effect of indirect taxes, arguing that indirect 
taxes normally lack the standard attributes of automatic stabilizers, such as progressivity. 
Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005) find that the effect of distortionary taxes-- like taxes on 
labor and capital--- are destabilizing, although including the direct taxes separately yields 
insignificant results. Debrun et al. (2008) break down government size in terms of its 
composition and find that the contribution of indirect taxes generally seems statistically weaker 
than that of direct taxes, reflecting the lower elasticity of the former to the business cycle. Posch 
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(2011) uses a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-2009 and studies the effect of 
various taxes like tax on income (labor income, security charges, and payroll taxes), taxes on 
capital (capital income, and on the capital stock as well as on capital transactions), the corporate 
income tax and consumption taxes. He concludes that the tax effects on volatility are not 
systematic; while the labor income tax and the corporate income tax are negatively correlated 
with volatility, the capital tax is positively correlative with volatility. For the consumption tax, 
no statistically significant effects are found. Finally, Martinez-Vazquez, Vulovic and Liu (2011) 
used a large panel of countries, including both developed and developing and find that the tax 
systems that rely more heavily on direct taxation as opposed to indirect taxation experience 
significantly less output volatility.  
3. Conceptual Framework 
As elaborated by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2003), fiscal policy may affect output volatility 
through at least three channels. The first channel refers to the role of automatic stabilizers built-
in the policy in the Keynesian tradition. In theory, automatic stabilizers smooth economic 
fluctuations by automatically lowering aggregate demand during economic booms and 
expanding it during recessions through taxes and welfare payments. During recessions, incomes 
and profits decrease lowering the tax payments relatively increasing the disposable income of 
individuals and retained earning in the case of corporations. Meanwhile, when unemployment 
increases, so do unemployment payments, which means increasing government expenditure and 
thus aggregate demand. The second channel is related directly to government expenditure that 
remains fixed in size independently of the stage of the economic cycle. Thus, by not responding 
to the cyclical conditions of the economy, they indirectly have a stabilizing function. The third 
channel is the discretionary fiscal policy measures that can be used by the government to react 
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relevantly to economic fluctuations. However, the majority of the empirical literature points to a 
destabilizing pro-cyclical bias of these discretionary policies (Lane, 2003; Alesina et al., 2008).  
The focus of this paper is the first channel – how different aspects of tax structure affect 
output volatility. There are three different mechanisms for how tax structure can make the built-
in automatic stabilizer in fiscal policies more stabilizing or destabilizing. First, higher degrees of 
personal income tax (PIT) progressivity with high marginal tax rates could substantially reduce 
fluctuations in after-tax income and so in private spending, without the need for any explicit 
(discretionary) policy changes. As pointed out by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), the effect of 
tax progressivity can be felt through both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, the 
mechanism is to translate the cushioning effect of taxes on changes in before-tax income into the 
lower volatility of household consumption. In other words, lower income leads to lower tax 
brackets and lower marginal tax payable, and therefore less volatility of disposable income. On 
the supply side, the logic is that when output falls, lower marginal tax rates could encourage 
greater labor supply and so offset the falling of output to some extent; conversely, when output 
rises, the higher marginal tax rates could discourage labor supply which otherwise prevents the 
rise of output.  
A second mechanism consists of the relative reliance on corporate income taxes (CIT). 
Corporate income taxes typically are not progressive, so the mechanism through which it affects 
output volatility is different than with personal income taxes. Since corporate income taxes are 
based on profit rather than revenue, and profits tend to fall faster than revenue during recessions, 
corporations end up paying much fewer taxes for relatively lower decreases in production during 
economic downturns. Since profits are more volatile than before-tax income during economic 
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cycles, higher reliance on CIT may be more stabilizing, depending on the elasticity aggregate 
demand with respect to consumption and investment.  
Given the importance of the role that PIT and CIT potentially play as automatic 
stabilizers, tax structures that rely more heavily on direct taxes are expected to be more output 
stabilizing than those that rely more on indirect taxes. Other types of direct taxes may play some 
role in stabilization as well.  While payroll and social security taxes can work as the PIT in a 
stabilizing role, they do so at a smaller scale due to being capped at some certain amount of 
income. In the case of property taxes, their revenues change little during business cycles, and 
thus do not have the same stabilizing properties as other direct taxes. On the other hand, indirect 
taxes such as consumption taxes on goods and services are typically not progressive and 
generally do not have the stabilizing properties of direct taxes such as the PIT. Overall, the 
literature confirms the stabilizing impact of tax ratio that relies more on direct taxes (Fatás and 
Mihov, 2001; Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat, 2005; Debrun et al., 2008). 
Finally, besides the stabilization impact of the various tax structure elements, the overall 
government size can play a role by amplifying the impact of automatic stabilizers. For example, 
the impact of PIT progressivity will be larger on the economy overall the larger is the 
government’s reach of citizen’s income, which is usually reflected in the share PIT revenue in 
overall economy or GDP. Larger share in GDP means larger share of the population impacted by 
the progressive nature of the tax structure, thus the larger will be the response to changing the 
economic output. It is hard to see a similar interaction impact for the CIT because a larger CIT 
collection with respect to GDP does not translate as directly on the level of aggregate demand.  
There are of course other stabilizing or destabilizing effects of fiscal policy reliant on 
expenditure, but they will not be the focus of the research in this paper. For example, more 
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generous unemployment insurance benefits as a part of government expenditure and paid 
through state-operated programs, increase and decrease along with unemployment rates which 
fluctuate along with economic cycles. During recession unemployment benefit payments raise 
increasing government expenditure and consequently aggregate demand and output in counter 
motion to decreasing output. The reverse happens during economic booms.  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
We will use an unbalanced panel of 109 countries from 1981 to 2014 with variables from 
different sources (see the appendix). Tax revenue variables are taken from the Government 
Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF). Personal income tax (PIT) 
structural progressivity measures are derived from the updated WTI dataset. All the other 
economic variables are derived from the World Development Indicator database. The data 
definitions are presented in table 36A in Appendix B, while the summary statistics are reported 
in table 25A. 
4.2 Measurement of Tax Structure Stabilizers/Destabilizers 
We will examine all three mechanisms of a tax structure that capture different aspects of 
tax structure and act as stabilizer or destabilizers discuss in the previous section.  
First, to measure PIT structural progressivity, we use marginal rate of progressivity of 
PIT based on income distribution developed by Sabirianova-Peter et al. (2010). To assess 
structural PIT progressivity for each country in the sample, they calculate the marginal rate of 
progression (MRP) through the following procedure. First, they compute the marginal rates for 
each country and each year at 100 different levels of pre-tax income that are evenly spread in the 
range from 4 to 400 percent of a country’s per capita. These variables are then used to construct 
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marginal rate progression indices by regressing marginal rates on the log of gross income. The 
tax structure is interpreted as progressive, proportional or regressive if the slope is positive, zero, 
or negative, respectively. We extend the dataset through 2014 and apply the same procedure to 
calculate structural progressivity measures. We expect that a higher degree of progressivity tends 
to stabilize output fluctuations, while higher regressivity will tend to destabilize output.  
Second, to assess the relative effect of direct versus indirect taxes we use an index 
evaluating the overall direct to indirect taxes (what we call Tax Mix ratio). As we described in 
previous sections, other taxes such as CIT also have automatic stabilization impact. However, we 
cannot explicitly measure those features as we do with PIT. Therefore, we use the direct to 
indirect tax mix ratio to account for automatic stabilization or destabilization features of all other 
taxes. We use two alternative definitions of the Tax Mix ratio - Tax Mix ratio 1 includes property 
taxes as part of direct taxes, while Tax Mix ratio 2 includes property taxes as part of indirect 
taxes. Property taxes typically do not vary a lot during business cycles, as their tax base tends to 
reflect the market value of the real state, and therefore tend to have limited stabilization effects. 
Although, if housing prices fall significantly during recessions-- and property taxes are tied to 
the market value of houses-- lower property tax burden will free up resources as well and may 
affect the aggregate demand positively. Moreover, if we assume forward shifting of property 
taxes to renters or users of the property, in which case it can be regressive14, the stabilizing effect 
may be larger since most likely renters would spend a higher portion of their income by 
comparison to capital owners who are more likely to save additional disposable income.  
Finally, to analyze the amplifying impact of government size we include the interaction 
of PIT structural progressivity and tax mix ratios with several aggregate and disaggregate 
                                                          
14 See for example Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist (1988) and Bahl et al. (2010). 
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government size measures based on the shares of government revenues or expenditure in overall 
GDP. As discussed in literature review section, there is evidence that government size itself has a 
stabilizing impact. 
4.3 Methodology and Estimation issues 
To estimate these mechanisms through which various aspects of tax structure impact 
volatility, we regress the volatility of economic growth, measured by the standard deviation of 
GDP growth rate, on the tax structure variables listed in the previous section and a vector of 
other explanatory variables following the work by Easterly et al. (2000). Easterly et al. (2000) 
emphasized the role of financial institutions and argued for the importance of using control 
variables such as “volatility of inflation” (measured by the standard deviation of M1 annual 
growth rate), trade openness and average GDP per capita as output volatility determinants. The 
volatility of trade volume and inflation are included as proxies for the degrees to which the 
economy is exposed to real and monetary shocks; average GDP per capita is intended to capture 
any possible relationship between wealth and economic volatility.  
For estimation purposes, we will use the sample of approximately 100 countries. We 
divide the sample into seven subsample periods15, each with five-year averages which allow us 
to smooth out short-term fluctuations.  
First, we analyze the impact of tax mix ratio on output volatility while controlling for PIT 
progressivity and proceed to estimate following equation: 
𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼1𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (4) 
                                                          
15 The actual sample size varies in estimations depending on availability of data for each variable. The seven time 
periods are 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2014.  
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where 𝑖 indicates country and 𝑡 denotes subsample period. The dependent variable, 𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 , is 
the average subsample standard deviation of annual GDP (real) per capita growth rate, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 is 
the structural PIT progressivity, 𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents 
all other control variables. We are interested in both 𝛼1 as a measure of the impact of PIT 
progressivity, and 𝛼2 as a measure of the impact of ratio of direct to indirect taxes. As mentioned 
previously, we use two alternative definitions of tax mix ratio. 
Moreover, we test the impact of the interaction between PIT progressivity and PIT 
Revenue as a percentage of GDP: 
𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼1𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (5) 
where 𝑃𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the PIT revenue as a percentage of GDP while other variables are defined as in 
equation 4. In addition to 𝛼1 and 𝛼3 as in equation 4, we are interested in 𝛼2 which measures the 
joint impact of PIT progressivity at various levels of PIT revenue size as a percentage of GDP. 
We expect that the stabilizing impact of structural progressivity is higher the larger is the size of 
PIT revenue in the economy since the automatic stabilizing factors are amplified. 
Second, we analyze the impact of the interaction of tax mix ratio with several aggregated 
and disaggregated measure of government size on output volatility while controlling for 
structural progressivity and proceed to estimate the following equation: 
𝑆𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑡
= 𝜃1𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (6) 
where 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the measure of government size which varies on degree of aggregation while other 
variables are defined as in equation 4. We define 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 in four different ways. Specifically, more 
aggregated versions defined as: 
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 Total Government Revenue as a percentage of GDP; 
 Total Government Expenditure as a percentage of GDP; 
and another disaggregated versions defined as: 
 Total Government Direct Revenue as a percentage of GDP; 
 Total Government Indirect Revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
In this extension, we are primarily interested in 𝜃2 as a measure of the joint impact of tax 
mix ratios and government size measures. We expect 𝜃2 to be negative and significant, which 
would imply that the impact of tax mix ratio is more stabilizing the larger is the share of 
government involvement in the economy. 
We use the fixed effect panel approach to account for unobserved time-invariant country 
factors. Moreover, we will perform separate estimations for the full sample of countries, as well 
as developed and developing countries to evaluate the differential effect of tax structure aspects 
on output volatility due to differences in economic structure (Martinez, Vulovic and Liu, 2011). 
Developed countries are defined as high-income OECD and non-OECD countries according to 
World Bank classification, and consequently, the developing are defined as lower income 
countries.  
As pointed by Attinasi et al. (2011), the degree of tax structure progressivity largely 
reflects the societal preference on equity and redistribution and determined rather by 
philosophical and political views on the role of society, or by efficiency considerations, while 
typically it is less related to stabilization policy objectives. Therefore, the measure of 
progressivity is quite unlikely to be endogenous in this context. Similarly, while it is unlikely to 
suspect the reverse causality between the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, the concerns are more 
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valid since governments have the discretion to decide to increase the share of direct taxes due to 
high output volatility.  
To account for the possible endogeneity of tax mix ratios, we instrument the tax mix ratio 
with the weighted average of the tax mix ratio for all other countries in the corresponding year, 
where the weights are the inverse of the distance (as described below) between the two countries. 
The instrument is calculated in a similar way as an instrumental variable for the corporate tax 
rate used by Lee and Gordon (2005).  
The value of the tax mix instrumental variable for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is calculated as  
𝑇𝑀𝑅_𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  
1
∑
1
𝑑𝑗
𝑛
𝑗−1
∑
1
𝑑𝑗
𝑛
𝑗−1
𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗            (7) 
where 𝑑𝑗 is the distance between the largest cities in country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 and 𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the tax 
mix ratio in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡. The underlying intuition for using this particular instrument is 
that output volatility in a country relative to others generally should not have an effect on the 
design of the tax mix ratio of those other countries, so the instrument is not correlated with the 
dependent variable. On the other hand, the design of the tax mix in a country is usually 
correlated with the design of tax mix in neighboring countries, especially in small countries16.  
5.  Empirical Results 
We follow the usual 2SLS approach in applying the instrumental variable in the 
estimation of the impact of tax mix ratio on output volatility. 
                                                          
16 The smaller the size of the country, the relatively shorter the distance between its largest city and largest cities in 
the neighboring countries, implying relatively stronger effect of their tax mix ratios on the tax mix ratio of other 
countries. The source for the distance measure between two countries is CEPII (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales, http://www.cepii.fr/).  
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Table 6 presents the estimation results of the impact of tax mix ratios while controlling 
structural progressivity on output volatility for the three samples – all countries, high-income 
countries, and low-income countries. More detailed tables can be found in Appendix B (tables 
26A through 28A).  
First, we find that for samples of all countries and low-income countries the tax mix ratio 
is stabilizing. In other words, higher reliance on direct taxes versus indirect taxes increases the 
macroeconomic stability in the country, and the impact persists no matter which definition of tax 
mix ratio we use. On the other hand, the magnitude of the impact is smaller when property tax is 
part of indirect taxes, which suggests some degree of stabilizing impact of property taxes in 
particular.  
The progressivity as a control is not significant in both cases. However, while the tax mix 
ratio is not significant for the sample of high-income countries, the structural progressivity is 
highly significant and negative, implying stabilizing impact. Moreover, we find stabilizing 
impact of the interaction term of progressivity and PIT revenue to GDP for high-income 
countries. On the other hand, for high-income countries whenever the interaction term is 
included the significance of the structural progressivity itself vanishes.  
Given relatively larger share of PIT revenue in high-income countries, as we expected, 
the higher structural progressivity of income taxes increases macroeconomic stability in a 
country with higher reliance on PIT revenues. In contrast, for the sample of all countries and 
low-income countries, we don’t see the significant impact of progressivity, although the tax mix 
ratio is mostly significant. So higher reliance on direct to indirect taxes has a stabilizing impact 
in low-income countries, which suggest the importance of automatic stabilizers in other taxes in 
these countries. On top of that, lower income countries on average have lower reliance on direct 
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taxes, particularly PIT revenue due to high average tax avoidance and evasion. Therefore, no 
significant of the impact of progressivity for this sample is understandable. 
Table 6 Tax Mix Ratio baseline estimations 
All Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -95.201 -19.291 -98.227 -20.522 
(117.715) (158.356) (117.385) (157.258) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -21.394  -21.769 
 (13.977)  (13.796) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as direct taxes 
-0.521*** -0.482***   
(0.139) (0.154)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as indirect taxes 
  -0.526*** -0.487*** 
  (0.146) (0.164) 
Observations 253 238 253 238 
High Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -232.23** 94.609 -232.636** 93.370 
(97.976) (228.359) (103.298) (234.902) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -36.839**  -37.094** 
 (17.118)  (17.413) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as direct taxes 
-0.359 -0.399   
(0.295) (0.297)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as indirect taxes 
  -0.341 -0.561 
  (0.509) (0.569) 
Observations 91 88 91 88 
Low Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -45.405 -21.235 -49.222 -24.639 
(175.650) (218.379) (175.338) (217.081) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -30.296  -30.484 
 (88.317)  (88.691) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as direct taxes 
-0.505*** -0.472**   
(0.186) (0.185)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property 
tax as indirect taxes 
  -0.497*** -0.461** 
  (0.185) (0.183) 
Observations 162 150 162 150 
Note: Detailed tables are in Appendix section. 
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Table 7 presents the estimation results for the impact of the interaction of tax mix ratios 
with aggregated measures of government size on output volatility by country samples. 
Government size is defined as either revenue or expenditure as a percentage of GDP. More 
detailed tables can be found in Appendix B (tables 29A through 31A). 
Once we include the interaction of tax mix ratios with total government revenue to GDP, 
we still find persisting stabilizing impact of tax mix ratios for a sample of all countries and low-
income countries. On the other hand, although for a sample of high-income countries the impact 
of tax mix ratio is not significant, the interaction term is negative and significant implying higher 
stabilizing impact of tax mix ratios the larger is the share of government revenue collections in 
the economy overall. We again observe that the magnitude of the tax mix ratio impact is smaller 
when property taxes are part of indirect taxes. In contrast, we do not find any significant impact 
of neither tax mix ratios nor the interaction terms when we use expenditure to GDP as a measure 
of government size. 
Also, while structural progressivity measures are not significant for a group of all 
countries or low-income countries, we find the progressivity negative and significant in all 
specification for high-income countries. In other words, we see the persistent stabilizing impact 
of PIT progressivity for high-income countries as we expected since high-income countries on 
average rely heavily on PIT as was discussed above compared to low-income countries. 
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Table 7 Tax Mix Ratio and Government Size Interactions 
All Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -97.113 -99.010 -118.063 -116.089 
(118.912) (118.073) (111.045) (110.157) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as direct taxes 
-0.616**  -0.438  
(0.236)  (0.580)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP 0.009    
(0.015)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as indirect taxes 
 -0.597**  -0.488 
 (0.244)  (0.739) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP  0.007   
 (0.018)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP   0.004  
  (0.018)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP    0.005 
   (0.024) 
Observations 253 253 205 205 
High Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -225.238** -228.490** -218.861* -219.902* 
(99.123) (105.862) (120.069) (123.658) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as direct taxes 
0.677  -0.386  
(0.653)  (0.612)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP -0.048*    
(0.026)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as indirect taxes 
 0.931  -0.577 
 (0.722)  (1.035) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP  -0.055   
 (0.033)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP   0.002  
  (0.014)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP    -0.000 
   (0.019) 
Observations 91 91 80 80 
Low Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -47.578 -49.606 -76.224 -79.034 
(175.931) (175.367) (173.880) (173.472) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as direct taxes 
-0.696**  -2.890  
(0.291)  (1.968)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP 0.021    
(0.018)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as indirect taxes 
 -0.664**  -3.112 
 (0.278)  (2.111) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP  0.019   
 (0.018)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP   0.113  
  (0.082)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP    0.122 
   (0.088) 
Observations 162 162 125 125 
Note: Detailed tables are in the Appendix section. 
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Table 8 presents the estimation results for the impact of the interaction of tax mix ratios 
with disaggregated measures of government size on output volatility by country samples. 
Government size here is defined as either direct revenue or indirect revenue as a percentage of 
GDP. More detailed tables can be found in Appendix B (tables 32A through 34A). 
Compared to results with aggregated measures of government size, we find similar 
results. We again see that tax mix ratios are usually negative and significant for the sample of all 
countries and low-income countries. Results suggest that higher reliance on direct taxes versus 
indirect taxes leads to the more stable macroeconomic environment.  
Moreover, we also find that for the sample of high-income countries the tax mix ratio 
itself is not significant, but the interaction terms are negative and significant. In other words, the 
results suggest that the stabilizing impact of tax mix ratio is higher the larger is the share of 
direct or indirect revenue in the economy. The magnitude of the direct revenue interaction is 
larger than for indirect revenue which suggests that as expected the stabilizing impact of direct 
revenue is larger.  
On top of that, the structural progressivity of income taxes is also stabilizing in every 
specification including the estimations of interaction between tax mix ratio and government size. 
We again can conclude that prevalence of PIT revenue in high-income countries emphasizes the 
importance of the degree of progressivity of income tax structure and its considerable role in 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
Overall, based on these results we can conclude that structural progressivity is more 
important in high-income countries due to higher reliance on income taxes. On top of that, 
automatic stabilizer in other taxes is more important in low-income countries, although the 
relative importance increases with government size in high-income countries. 
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Table 8 Tax Mix Ratio and Direct vs Indirect Revenue interactions 
All Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -94.676 -97.825 -96.680 -99.967 
(117.312) (116.481) (116.517) (116.088) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
-0.567*  -0.433**  
(0.322)  (0.175)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP 0.004    
(0.020)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.552  -0.439** 
 (0.357)  (0.181) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP  0.002   
 (0.025)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP   -0.072  
  (0.084)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP    -0.071 
   (0.085) 
Observations 253 253 253 253 
High Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -236.412** -240.357** -251.137** -251.508** 
(103.392) (111.079) (93.618) (103.216) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
0.445  0.214  
(0.782)  (0.406)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP -0.032    
(0.023)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 1.033  0.523 
 (0.860)  (0.706) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP  -0.056*   
 (0.028)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP   -0.338**  
  (0.126)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP    -0.331*** 
   (0.114) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 
Low Income Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -41.190 -44.392 -49.489 -53.992 
(173.866) (173.428) (173.079) (172.551) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
-0.651  -0.452**  
(0.512)  (0.214)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP 0.015    
(0.041)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.661  -0.440** 
 (0.506)  (0.214) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP  0.017   
 (0.041)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP   -0.053  
  (0.113)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP    -0.059 
   (0.117) 
Observations 162 162 162 162 
Note: Detailed tables are in Appendix section. 
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Finally, we use weighted tax mix ratios of all other countries in each consecutive year as 
an instrumental variable to address the possible endogeneity of tax mix ratios. We remove PIT 
progressivity from controls because it leads to possible multicollinearity in the first stage and 
leads to insignificant results, even though the correlation between country’s tax mix ratio and 
weighted tax mix instrumental variable have 0.3 correlation.  
Table 9 presents the summary of first and second stage estimation results, along with the 
Cragg-Donald Statistic for evaluation of the strength of the instrument. The more detailed table 
is presented in Appendix B (table 35A). 
First, we find the weighted tax mix ratio instrument to be non-weak in the first stage for 
all countries and high-income countries with a highly significant coefficient. Cragg-Donald 
statistic is above 16 and even higher for tax mix ratio definition that includes property taxes as 
indirect taxes. For all these cases the statistic is significant at 10% level by Stock-Yogo 
classification and can be considered as non-weak.  
On the other hand, the instrumental variables are not significant for low-income countries 
with very low Cragg-Donald Statistic, which implies weak instrumental variable. Therefore, 
second stage results for low-income countries are not reliable.  
In the second stage, unlike the previous results, we find tax mix ratios insignificant for all 
and high-income countries for which the instrumental variable was non-weak. It is important to 
note that more thorough investigation of the instrumental variable strength and validity is needed 
to make more reliable conclusions.  
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Table 9 Tax Mix Ratio Instrumental Variable Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ALL ALL High High Low Low 
Panel B. Second Stage             
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with 
property tax as direct taxes 
-0.865  -1.065  1.913  
(0.959)  (1.118)  (3.034)  
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with 
property tax as indirect taxes 
 -0.877  -1.049  1.011 
 (0.932)  (1.083)  (1.865) 
Observations 524 524 189 189 335 335 
Panel A. First Stage       
Weighted Tax Mix Ratio (IV) -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.119*** -0.058 -0.08 
(0.0213) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.051) (0.052) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 16.981 20.573 17.51 32.008 0.395 0.707 
Note: Detailed tables are in the Appendix section. 
6. Conclusion 
Given the importance of the output stabilization function of the government in the light of 
recent economic fluctuations, the use of fiscal policy to embed automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary reactions is one of the key leverages of the government. We focus on built in 
automatic stabilizers in tax system such as progressivity of income tax structure. In this essay, 
we analyze the comprehensive impact of tax structure dimensions on output volatility using 
updated measures of PIT structural progressivity for over 100 countries from 1981 to 2014, as 
well as tax mix ratios defined as the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. On top of that, we study the 
interaction effect of progressivity and tax mix rations with government size measured in 
aggregated and disaggregated revenue and expenditure to GDP. We use two measures of tax mix 
ratio – with property tax as part of direct taxes versus indirect taxes, and estimate the 
heterogeneous impact of tax structure in high income versus low-income countries.  
We find that for samples of all countries and low-income countries the tax mix ratio is 
stabilizing. In other words, higher reliance on direct taxes versus indirect taxes increases the 
macroeconomic stability in the country, and the impact persists no matter which definition of tax 
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mix ratio we use. On the other hand, the magnitude of the impact is smaller when property tax is 
part of indirect taxes, which suggests some degree of stabilizing impact of property taxes in 
particular. The structural progressivity is highly significant and negative for high-income 
countries, implying stabilizing impact. Moreover, we find stabilizing impact of the interaction 
term of progressivity and PIT revenue to GDP for high-income countries.  
Once we include the interaction of tax mix ratios with total government revenue to GDP, 
we still find persisting stabilizing impact of tax mix ratios for a sample of all countries and low-
income countries. On the other hand, the interaction term is negative and significant implying 
higher stabilizing impact of tax mix ratios the larger is the share of government revenue 
collections in the economy overall. In addition, we find the progressivity negative and significant 
in all specification for high-income countries. In other words, we see the persistent stabilizing 
impact of PIT progressivity for high-income countries as we expected since high-income 
countries on average rely heavily on PIT as was discussed above compared to low-income 
countries. Similar results are found when we use direct or indirect revenue as government size.  
Overall, based on these results we can conclude that structural progressivity is more 
important in high-income countries due to higher reliance on income taxes. On top of that, 
automatic stabilizers in other taxes are more important in low-income countries, although the 
relative importance increases with government size in high-income countries. Finally, when 
using weighted tax mix ratio as an instrumental variable to address possible endogeneity, the 
results indicate no significant impact of tax mix ratio on output volatility for a sample of all and 
high-income countries for which the first stage results reveal non-weak instrument.  
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CHAPTER 3. A SUPERIOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. Introduction 
Ever since the seminal work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) titled “The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development''-- which has been cited almost 9000 times since 
its publication--, there has been a continuous debate on whether or not institutional quality is the 
causal key to economic development (henceforth referred to as AJR (2001)). In fact, institutions 
were hypothesized to be an important factor for economic prosperity decades before AJR's paper 
was published (Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1998; Hall 
and Jones 1999; Rodrik 1999 and others). However, prior to AJR (2001), there was no successful 
attempt to actually identify the causal link between institutional quality and economic 
development due to severe endogeneity issues such as reverse causality; after all, high-quality 
institutions are perhaps as much a result of economic prosperity as they are their cause. What 
AJR (2001) offered was a plausible solution to the identification problem. The key was an 
instrumental variable for institutional quality defined as European colonial settler mortality rates 
in the countries that were colonized. The idea is that settler mortality rates at the time of 
colonization identified whether or not European colonizers settled and established “inclusive” 
institutions or just colonized and established “extractive” institutions. The type of institutions 
established further conditioned the modern institutional framework, and thus the path to modern 
economic prosperity. One limitation of AJR (2001) was that the sample of countries included 
only those countries colonized by Europeans. The presumption was that if the causal link 
between institutions and economic development could be established for this sample of 
countries, then the same causal link could hold for all other countries, other things held constant. 
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Being a key to unlock the causal relationship, settler mortality rate was also the weakest 
link in the chain. Questions about unresolvable measurement error arise from the fact that AJR’s 
(2001) Settler Mortality was constructed from a combination of death records ranging from 
European soldiers to Catholic bishops during times of peace and military campaigns, and that 36 
of the 64 country-level observations in their sample were assigned mortality rates from other 
countries, often based on mistaken or conflicting evidence (Albouy 2008; Albouy 2012; Sachs 
2012). The main argument of the doubters was that when these data issues are controlled for, the 
relationship between mortality and expropriation risk lacks robustness, and the instrumental-
variable estimates become unreliable, often with infinite confidence intervals. An additional 
issue is that the quality of death records was likely quite different when colonizers settled and 
established “inclusive” institutions that when they just colonized and established “extractive” 
institutions. In other words, the instrumental key variable is imperfect enough to have caused 
doubt that it really helps answer whether or not institutional quality is the main factor behind 
economic development. 
Therefore, our starting point in this paper is that there is still a need for a better key 
instrumental variable that unambiguously defines the settling decision by European colonizers at 
the time, and consequently the establishment of “good” versus “bad” institutions. What we 
propose as the key instrumental variable is the malaria environment before the 20th century 
while controlling for tropicality and disease stability (Kiszewski et al. 2004). The disease 
environment, mainly malaria, was a key factor in settler mortality rates as hypothesized by AJR 
(2001). In fact, the settler mortality rates used by AJR also included death from battles, which is 
hard to imagine it was as important in the settling decision for European colonizers who had 
superior weapons and military tactics. Thus, the malaria environment as a proxy for disease 
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environment at the time of settlement, we argue, is a superior instrument that defines the 
settlement decisions, and subsequent quality of early and modern institutions. This instrument is 
more accurate and does not suffer from the type of measurement error present in the proxy used 
by AJR. In particular, the malaria environment is not subject to the differences in quality likely 
associated with death records. Also, using the malaria environment allows analyzing a sample of 
countries significantly larger than the sample colonized by Europeans. 
Our key variable describing the malaria risk environment in 1900 at the country level 
(from here on referred to as Malaria Endemicity 1900) is calculated based on the 1960s World 
Health Organization publication, "The Geography of Malaria: A Medical-Geographical Study of 
an Ancient Disease," which mapped the peak distribution of malaria before the medical advances 
of the 20th century. More specifically, Malaria Endemicity 1900 measures the malaria 
environment before the discovery that the transmission channel was through mosquitos and 
therefore before the successful eradication efforts that followed. This measure is exogenous to 
both institutional quality and economic development. In particular, Malaria Endemicity 1900 
reflects the malaria prevalence in earlier centuries because no changes in the disease 
environment had taken place through those times. For those reasons, Malaria Endemicity 1900 is 
a good determinant of the disease environment, and the consequent settling decisions of 
European colonizers to establish “inclusive” versus “extractive” institutions, as proposed by AJR 
(2001). 
In our analysis, we find that Malaria Endemicity 1900 performs as a very strong 
instrument for modern institutions. The instrumented institutional quality variables have 
significantly larger positive impacts on economic development compared to those from the usual 
OLS estimation. Moreover, we replicate the results in AJR (2001) and find that Malaria 
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Endemicity 1900 is again a strong instrument. However, we also find that the impact of the 
average protection from expropriation risk on economic development is lower when 
instrumented with Malaria Endemicity 1900—as compared to Settler Mortality.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a brief review of the 
literature. Section three describes the data sources. Section four contains a simplified conceptual 
framework and section five presents the identification strategy. Section six discusses the 
empirical results while section seven shows the replication of AJR (2001) findings. Section eight 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
There has been much debate over the determinants of modern economic development, 
especially between the competing hypotheses emphasizing the role of institutions versus the role 
of geography, led by Daron Acemoglu and coauthors and Jeffrey Sachs and coauthors, 
respectively. Even though the intensity of the debate is currently down, there are still many 
important questions that remain unanswered, especially concerning the validity of the 
instruments and, in particular, the role played by disease environments on economic growth. 
The central argument within the literature about the relationship between disease 
environments and economic growth is whether or not the effects are ongoing and direct, or 
historical and indirect. AJR (2001) have argued for an indirect impact of malaria on current 
economic growth and claim that the prevalence of malaria is highly endogenous and that the 
contemporary persistence of malaria stems from the poor institutions of low-income countries 
that were unable to eradicate malaria.  
Moreover, AJR (2001) express skepticism over malaria’s direct effect on economic 
performance --as has been described by Gallup et al. (1999) -- which they expected it to work 
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through poor health and high mortality rates. AJR (2001) notes that most people living in high 
malaria areas have developed some immunity to the disease, and if they survive to the age of 
five, and afterward, if they get sick most probably it won’t be fatal. Therefore, they argue that the 
effect of malaria has been mainly an indirect one through its effect on settler mortality and the 
type of institutions established by the settlers, which in turn defined the long-term economic 
development of countries, including their current performance.  
In a later paper, Acemoglu et al. (2002) (henceforth referred to as AJR (2002)) further 
develop the indirect channel argument for the effect of malaria on economic growth through the 
type of institutions that got established. The authors argue that since developed areas before 
colonization were those that were more urbanized and more densely populated, and malaria was 
more endemic in such areas due to more frequent contacts, Europeans preferred to settle in less 
dense areas, and hence less endemic areas where they established inclusive institutions. AJR 
(2001, 2002) found in both papers that the malaria variable used by Gallup et al. (1999) was 
mostly statistically insignificant by itself as an additional control variable. 
Later, following the criticism of AJR (2001, 2002), Gallup and Sachs (2001) and Sachs 
and Malaney (2002) have used a malaria risk index, which is based on the 1994 world malaria 
prevalence map by WHO. Their main finding was that even after controlling for institutions, a 
higher risk of malaria negatively affects current income per capita, thus supporting the argument 
of a direct link. Gallup and Sachs (2001) and Sachs and Malaney (2002) also add that the reason 
why AJR (2001) didn’t find a direct effect of malaria is that they restricted their data sample to 
former colonies, which are mainly in the tropics, therefore leading to low variability of the 
malaria environments.  
Similar results to those in Gallup and Sachs (2001) and Sachs and Malaney (2002) were 
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reported by Cartensen and Gundlach (2006). These authors argue that even though the 
population in malaria endemic areas develop immunity through sickle cells, these cells affect the 
health and human capital of the population through sickle cell anemia, and so they also find an 
independent effect of malaria on GDP per capita after controlling for institutions.  
More recently, the most-used malaria prevalence variable utilized in the economic 
development literature is the Malaria Ecology index. Developed by Kiszewski et al. (2004), 
Malaria Ecology is a spatially disaggregated dataset which relies on regional attributes 
unaffected by public health interventions and economic conditions. The Malaria Ecology index 
has been used widely in empirical analyses of the causes of development disparities (Besley and 
Kudamatsu 2006; Glaeser et al. 2004; Henderson, Storeygard and Weil 2012; Lorentzen, 
McMillan and Wacziarg 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013; Nordhaus 2005; Nunn 
and Wantechekon 2011; Nunn and Puga 2012; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004).  
In a recent paper, McCord and Sachs (2013) also use the Malaria Ecology index, which 
they argue is exogenous to development because it consists of ecological factors and excludes 
mosquito abundance and human population. They find a highly significant negative effect of the 
Malaria Ecology index variable on GDP per capita in 2010. They also find a significant (at 5% 
confidence level) negative impact of the Malaria Ecology on GDP growth using 1960-2010 data.  
However, it appears that both sides of the argument have been focusing on the wrong 
measurement of the incidence of malaria. To break the impasse, one would need to measure the 
prevalence of malaria at the time of colonization by European settlers. This is what we propose 
to do in this paper by introducing the first exogenous index of historic mosquito-borne disease 
prevalence. This allows us to make a novel contribution to the literature on the direct versus the 
indirect impact of disease environment on economic growth in three major ways.  
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First, this measure of malaria prevalence is truly exogenous to current development 
because it captures the malaria endemicity before the public health interventions at the end of 
19th century upon discovery of mosquitos as a transmission mechanism. Given that no effective 
global public interventions were done previously, we can assume that it is also a good measure 
of malaria prevalence during earlier centuries of the colonization era. Further, this measure is 
superior to all other measures of disease environment previously used in the literature because 
unlike the Malaria Ecology measure, Malaria Endemicity reflects the actual prevalence and 
impact of malaria rather than its potential harm.  
Second, Malaria Endemicity is not subject to the measurement errors associated with 
Setler Mortality. This is because it is recorded for all observations –and not estimated for some 
as in the case of Settler Mortality, and because the quality of the data is not potentially affected 
by the type of institutions present at the time of the data reading—unlike the case again of 
Settlers Mortality. Malaria Endemicity is also likely a better reflection of settlement decision 
because it is doubtful that colonizers refused to settle due to losses from battles—which are 
included in Settlers Mortality-- given their superior military power.  
Third, using Malaria Endemicity allows us to significantly enlarge the sample of 
countries beyond those settled by Europeans and for which there either directly or imputed data 
on Settlers Mortality. Beyond the additional degrees of freedom allowed, this is significant 
because it allows us to test the causal link between institutional quality and economic 
development outside the direct historical influence of European settlers.   
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3. Data 
3.1 Calculating Malaria Endemicity 
We use the mean population-weighted malaria endemicity for the county estimated for 
1900 as a proxy measure of historical mosquito-borne disease ferocity. This index more 
accurately captures the variation of malaria risk than measures previously used in the empirical 
literature and is not subject to the confounding impact of 20th-century public health campaigns 
to fight malaria. 
Global historical malaria endemicity was first published by Lysenko and Semashko 
(1968) as part of a World Health Organization (WHO) report, and contemporary malariologists 
have revived the index to characterize historical malaria geography and prevalence (Hay, et al., 
2004). Endemicity is an ordered variable, delineated by differences in the parasite rate (PR) for 
the 2 to 10-year-old age cohort and captures the distribution of malaria in 1900, just before the 
onset of vector control. The highest endemicity level is holoendemic with PR > 0.75; the 
remaining regions, from high to low, are classified as hyperendemic with 𝑃𝑅 ∈ (0.5,0.75], 
mesoendemic 𝑃𝑅 ∈ (0.1,0.5], hypoendemic 𝑃𝑅 ≤ 0.1, and epidemic regions, which include 
places where some malaria existed as well as malaria-free areas. The PR was constructed from 
interpolation of data from records of disease and vector presence (e.g., spleen rates, parasite 
rates, sickle cell incidence, sporozoite rates, and biting rates) and mapped malaria at the peak of 
its assumed historical distribution, using a combination of expert opinion and climatic measures 
such as temperature and rainfall isohyets. 
We convert the Lysenko and Semashko (1968) map into a GIS dataset made up of grid 
cells taking the Harvest Choice Grid Database at the one-degree resolution (Guo et al. 2015; Hay 
et al. 2004; Lysenko and Semashko 1968). Then, we calculate the population-weighted mean 
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endemicity for each country i over j grid cells using the following equation (8): 
 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 1900𝑖 = ∑
𝑃𝑜𝑝.1900𝑖𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝.1900𝑖
× 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=0     (8) 
This new country-level variable, Malaria Endemicity 1900, is continuous and mapped in 
figure 3 (Gooch 2017). The distribution of the global population is a backward projection 
estimated by the History Database of the Global Environment (HYDE). More specifically, 
HYDE estimates historic population by aligning the 1994 population distribution map of spatial 
resolution 0.5-degree latitude by 0.5-degree longitude. The data are provided by the National 
Center for Geographic Information and Analysis (NCGIA) at 0.5-degree resolution extrapolated 
back in time accounting for population information taken from historical census and continent 
population growth trends (Goldewijk 2005; Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen 2010). 
Figure 3 Map of population-weighted Malaria Endemicity 190017 
                                                          
17 Mapped and calculated by authors 
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3.2 Malaria Endemicity versus Other Malaria Measures 
As stated above, a main goal of our research is to extend the literature identifying the 
direct effects of disease environments and the indirect effects through institutional quality on 
economic development. Specifically, we use three proxy measures of historic disease 
environment to complement the currently available proxies for historic disease environment. 
Empirical research since 1999, has depended on one of the following measures: (1) Settler 
Mortality (AJR, 2001), (2) measures of Malaria Index during the 20th century (Gallup et al. 
1999; Gallup and Sachs 2001), and (3) Malaria Ecology (Kiszewski et al. 2004). Each of these 
measures has important shortcomings when the objective is to capture actual malaria prevalence 
in the historical past. To judge the likeness of Settler Mortality in AJR (2001) (of which malaria 
was one of the main causes) and our own Malaria Endemicity 1900, we conduct a pairwise 
comparison of proxies and graph the results in figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Pairwise correlation between Settler Mortality and Malaria Endemicity 190018 
                                                          
18 Settler Mortality data comes from AJR (2001). 
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Important distinctions between the data sets are: (1) The Settler Mortality dataset is 
relatively smaller, containing only 64 countries; (2) countries with low Malaria Endemicity 1900 
still have relatively high Settler Mortality; and (3) there is a high correlation between Settler 
Mortality and Malaria Endemicity 1900 for mesoendemic, hyperendemic, and holoendemic 
countries. 
In contrast, a post-1900 Malaria Index captures more than just the disease environment as 
it is influenced by the efficacy of the mosquito control campaigns which in turn were affected by 
the natural disease stability and quality of the institutions managing the public health campaigns. 
Therefore, a post-1900 Malaria Index is endogenous. The map in figure 5 shows the decline of 
malaria’s global distribution between 1900 and 2002. 
 
Figure 5 The global distribution of population at risk of malaria: the past, present, and future 
(From Hay et al, 2004) 
In their response to AJR (2001), McArthur and Sachs (2001) argued that tropical climates 
with the prevalent infectious disease also have related obstacles to development such as 
technological innovation. For this purpose, McArthur and Sachs (2001) used the Malaria Index 
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during the 20th century as a time-invariant regional variable. 
To illuminate the differences between the Malaria Index in 1994 and our variable, 
Malaria Endemicity 1900, we have graphed the variables’ pairwise correlation in figure 6. The 
clusters of countries along the top and bottom edges of the graph suggest that the Malaria Index 
in 1994 lacks the variation that existed in 1900. The somewhat binary nature of the Malaria 
Index in 1994 reflects the theory of disease stability, such that 20th-century sanitation campaigns 
in regions with unstable malaria were able to eradicate the disease, while regions with stable 
malaria continued to have cases (MacDonald 1952). 
 
Figure 6 Pairwise correlation between Malaria Risk in 1994 and population-weighted Malaria 
Endemicity 190019 
The third and latest measure of malaria disease environment used in the economic 
development literature has also been taken directly from tropical epidemiological research. 
Known as Malaria Ecology, this index is based on a formula accounting for temperature, 
                                                          
19 Malaria risk in 1994 data comes from Gallup and Sachs (2001). 
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mosquito abundance, and vector specificity, among other climatological and mosquito 
conditions. Malaria Ecology was created as a spatially disaggregated dataset (Kiszewski et al. 
2004), and it is considered an instrument of malaria risk because its construction relies on 
regional attributes unaffected by public health interventions and economic conditions. Figure 7 
illustrates the pairwise comparison of country-level endemicity and ecology indices, which have 
a correlation of 0.58. At the country level, we calculate the mean endemicity and ecology index 
weighted by the population in 1900. As the endemicity index increases along the x-axis, the 
ecology index does not increase at the same rate. Instead of a proportional increase, values of the 
ecology index are high for a subsample of countries with high endemicity and which are 
disproportionately located in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 7 Pairwise correlation between Malaria Ecology and Malaria Endemicity 190020 
  
                                                          
20 Malaria ecology data comes from Kiszewski et al. (2004). 
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To exemplify this difference, we compare eight malaria-prone countries from five 
continents: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Honduras, Mali, Chad, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Costa Rica. 
All have a population-weighted endemicity index of 3.6 to 3.9, which characterizes them as 
mesoendemic countries and just below the hyperendemic category. Their population-weighted 
ecology indices, however, are very different. African countries have population-weighted 
ecology indices of 17 to 24, while non-African countries have indices less than 2. The ecology 
index heavily weights the prevalence of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa, even though nearly 50 
percent of each of these countries' 2-10-year-old cohort had malaria symptoms in 1900. 
The ecology index provides an accurate account of the success of vector control in terms 
of eradication or intense suppression but does not capture the prevalence of malaria that 
historical communities encountered. As described in (Kiszewski et al. 2004) and depicted in 
figure 7, the ecology index displays a sharp transition from unsuitable ecology to suitable 
ecology. This abrupt change resembles the transition from the unstable steady-state to the stable 
steady-state central to malaria transmission models (Hay, Smith and Snow 2008; MacDonald 
1952; Ross 1911). A simple way to understand the difference between these steady states is that 
stable malaria is difficult to suppress, while the transmission cycle of unstable malaria is easy to 
interrupt. Thus, regions, where MBD was eradicated, had naturally unstable malaria or a low 
ecology index. 
We welcome the differences between Malaria Ecology in 1900 and Malaria Endemicity 
1900 because together the two indices capture more information about the conditions prevalent 
in the past. By controlling for Malaria Ecology in 1900 which captures the resiliency of malaria 
to shocks, both natural and anthropogenic, Malaria Endemicity 1900 then accurately measures 
suffering due to malaria during the time of colonization, and not later. 
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3.3 Economic Development and Other Variables 
The summary statistics for the variable of interest, outcomes, and relevant covariates are 
presented in table 10.  
Table 10 Summary statistics 
VARIABLES 
Number 
of obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Malaria Ecology (1900 Population-
weighted) 
161 3.827 6.826 0.000 31.556 
Rule of Law 1996 157 -0.174 0.984 -2.203 2.023 
Log [population density in 1500 CE] 155 0.862 1.471 -3.817 3.842 
Log [Neolithic transition timing (1500 
CE baseline)] 
149 8.196 0.692 5.704 9.210 
Log [absolute latitude] 159 2.967 0.957 0.000 4.277 
Log [land suitability for agriculture] 153 -1.482 1.364 -5.857 -0.041 
Log [temperature] 158 3.602 0.384 -0.000 3.894 
Log [precipitation] 158 4.188 0.906 1.068 5.560 
WGI 1996 156 -0.171 0.938 -2.235 1.836 
GDP 1950 124 7.283 0.969 5.667 10.322 
GDP 1975 124 7.897 1.077 6.239 10.469 
GDP 2000 145 8.123 1.159 5.380 10.256 
Log[% Within 100 km. of Ice-free 
Coast] 
159 2.797 1.652 0.000 4.615 
Log[Percent Tropical +1] 159 1.942 2.152 0.000 4.615 
Log[Avg. Terrain Ruggedness] 159 -0.159 0.993 -3.310 1.908 
4. Applications of Malaria Endemicity 1900 
4.1 Direct Effect of Malaria on Economic Development: Reduced Form 
Malaria Endemicity captures the geographic distribution and intensity of the mosquito-
borne disease and was a time invariant characteristic of a region before 1900. After the discovery 
of the malaria amoeba, Plasmodium, in the mosquito saliva in 1898, widespread interruption of 
malaria and yellow fever transmission began, and in turn disease incidence decreased in many 
areas.  
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To begin with, we conduct a reduced form analysis of the relationship between pre-
anthropogenic malaria prevalence, Malaria Endemicity 1900, and current measures of 
development using the following specification: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 1900 + 𝑪𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖                   (9) 
The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖, captures the variation in development for modern-day 
country, i. The variable of interest, Malaria Endemicity 1900, is indexed by the average malaria 
prevalence for country i. The vector, 𝐶𝑖
′, contains time invariant characteristics of the country 
which includes Malaria Ecology 1900 (Kiszewski et al. 2004). Continent and colonizer indicator 
variables are contained in the vector, 𝑋𝑖
′. 
4.2 Indirect Effect of Malaria on Economic Development: Instrumental Variable  
The historic and exogenous nature of our variable, Malaria Endemicity 1900, allows us to 
employ the conceptual framework introduced by AJR (2001) and substitute Malaria Endemicity 
1900 for their Settler Mortality variable. Intuitively, AJR (2001) use Settler Mortality as a 
snapshot of the disease environment during the time of colonization, and we propose that 
Malaria Endemicity 1900 offers a superior snapshot of the morbidity and mortality consequences 
of malaria. Unlike the narrow connection between observations on Settler Mortality rate in a 
colony and the quality of the colonial institutions, Malaria Endemicity 1900 likely has a broader 
influence on historic developments such as indigenous advancement. For that reason, we include 
additional covariates in our analysis to capture potential variation in the early progress of those 
countries. Additionally, Malaria Endemicity 1900 is related to the efficacy of suppression 
campaigns through its high correlation with disease stability (MacDonald 1952). We eliminate 
this confounding influence on 20th-century economic growth by controlling for disease stability 
using the covariate Malaria Ecology. 
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The indirect effect of Malaria Endemicity 1900 on current economic growth is based on 
its determining effect on the settling of European colonists and the different institutional 
frameworks that developed depending on the extent and presence of the disease, as hypothesized 
by AJR (2001). Recall that the main argument is that malaria and the overall disease 
environment affected settler mortality, which in turn defined the type of institutions established 
(extractive versus inclusive), which finally affected the long-term development of the country, 
including its current economic state. The line of causation is illustrated in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Revision of schematic summary of mechanisms linking Malaria Endemicity 1900 to 
current economic performance (Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
Contrarily, Malaria Ecology 1900 is time invariant and, therefore, the variation in the 
disease environment captured by Malaria Ecology persists through each stage of the progression, 
from affecting the settlers’ mortality rate to current institutional quality and economic 
performance. The time invariance nature of Malaria Ecology does not meet the necessary 
requirements of an instrumental variable for this research question. However, the time invariant 
nature of Malaria Ecology 1900 provides us with an opportunity to control for the likelihood of 
successful eradiation and suppression efforts during the 20th century, thereby keeping Malaria 
Endemicity 1900 as a snapshot of only historic malaria. Proponents of the direct effects of 
malaria led by Sachs and others argue that the consequences of this deadly disease affected the 
level of development before the 20th century and that it continues to directly affect the current 
economic development of countries affected by malaria, most of which are in Africa. 
By using a reduced form specification, the mechanism through which Malaria 
Malaria 
Endemicity in 
1900
Settler 
Mortality 
Rate
Settlements
Early 
Institutions
Current 
Institutions
Current 
Economic 
Performance
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Endemicity 1900 affects contemporary economic performance is uncertain. Therefore, to confine 
the impact of Malaria Endemicity 1900 on current-day outcomes exclusively through early 
institutional quality, we employ a 2SLS estimation strategy: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑉: 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 1900) + 
+ 𝑪𝑖
′𝜌 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝜇 + 𝜑𝑖                                                                                                                   (10)              
 
Almost all variables are the same in equation (9) and (10). The exception is that in the 
2SLS specification the coefficient of interest, 𝜋1, captures the impact of early institutional 
quality on current economic performance by only exploiting variation in Malaria Endemicity 
1900, while in the OLS reduced form equation, the coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, measures the 
general impact of Malaria Endemicity 1900 on current-day economic performance. 
We assert that Malaria Endemicity 1900 satisfies the three criteria for a valid 
instrumental variable when Malaria Ecology 1900 is included as a covariate. Specifically, 
Malaria Endemicity 1900 (1) is unrelated to an area’s potential for both economic growth and 
institutional quality, (2) has a non-weak relationship with institutional quality during colonial 
times and current-day, and (3) the non-weak relationship is a monotonic relationship, all of 
which prevail when disease stability, Malaria Ecology 1900, is taken into account. 
The first criterion is analogous to the assumption 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝜉) which is untestable, and 
particularly difficult to support using an exactly identified IV model. In our model, we control 
for the confounding influence of tropicality and malaria stability that is commonly correlated 
with both malaria prevalence and economic growth. By taking into account tropicality, which 
has been cited to inhibit capital accumulation, and malaria stability, which is inversely related to 
the success of malaria suppression campaigns, we propose that the level of Malaria Endemicity 
in 1900 is otherwise exogenous. 
The other two criteria, taken together, require that the IV have a non-weak monotonic 
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relationship with institutional quality. Evidence of a non-weak relationship between Malaria 
Endemicity 1900 and institutional quality is provided by the Cragg-Donald statistic in table 12, 
which tests the null hypothesis that the first-stage relationship is weak. In our analysis, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Finally, the relationship between Malaria Endemicity 1900 and 
institutional quality needs to be monotonic. Following our modified line of causation depicted in 
figure 8, greater Malaria Endemicity 1900 led to greater Settler Mortality which, in turn, led to 
poorer institutional quality, never the reverse. Malaria Endemicity 1900, therefore, meets the 
necessary conditions to be a valid IV. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Reduced Form 
In table 11, we present the reduced form relationship between Malaria Endemicity 1900 
and five measures of modern development: the log of real per capita GDP in 1950, 1975, and 
2000, as well as the average World Governance Indicator in 1996 and Rule of Law in 1996 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010; Maddison-Project 2013). Each specification includes a 
number of covariates that aim at removing the confounding influence of variation in indigenous 
development, accessibility, climate, agriculture suitability, and ease of malaria eradication (as 
captured by Malaria Ecology 1900). We also control for continent and colonizer fixed effects.  
Using a reduced form specification, we investigate the relationship between historic 
malaria risk and per capita income in 1950, 1975, and 2000, columns 1-3 of table 11 
respectively. We find a significant negative impact of Malaria Endemicity 1900 on all GDP per 
capita measures, although the magnitude varies. The magnitude of the impact is similar for 1950 
and 1975 GDP per capita, while for 2000 GDP per capita the magnitude is approximately 1.5 
times higher. This large change likely reflects a growing inequality in economic growth between 
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low and high endemic countries spurred by growth in low endemic countries. Moreover, Malaria 
Endemicity 1900 has a negative and significant impact on institutional variables like WGI and 
Rule of Law in 1996. The magnitude of the impact is almost the same for two measures. We also 
see that the Malaria Ecology 1900 is also significant and negative for GDP 2000 and the 
institutional quality variables.   
Table 11 Reduced-form relationship between Malaria Endemicity 1900 and development 
indicators 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES GDP 1950 GDP 1975 GDP 2000 WGI 1996 Rule of Law 1996 
            
Malaria endemicity (population 
weighted) 
-0.198* -0.189* -0.336*** -0.283*** -0.282*** 
(0.112) (0.106) (0.078) (0.069) (0.075) 
Log [Malaria Ecology (1900 
population weighted)] 
-0.013 -0.007 -0.020* -0.029* -0.037** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Log [temperature] -0.472 -0.490 -0.186 -0.152 -0.048 
(0.482) (0.577) (0.542) (0.536) (0.574) 
Log [precipitation] -0.070 -0.235 -0.089 0.176 0.144 
(0.166) (0.174) (0.177) (0.168) (0.185) 
Log [absolute latitude] -0.135 -0.185 -0.081 0.074 0.100 
(0.113) (0.154) (0.133) (0.090) (0.100) 
Log [Neolithic transition timing 
(1500 CE baseline)] 
0.195 0.231 0.192 -0.041 0.036 
(0.178) (0.161) (0.253) (0.235) (0.245) 
Log [population density in 1500 
CE] 
-0.049 -0.128 -0.035 0.030 0.066 
(0.081) (0.091) (0.081) (0.070) (0.077) 
Log [terrain ruggedness] -0.111 -0.055 -0.010 -0.017 0.005 
(0.090) (0.087) (0.070) (0.070) (0.077) 
Log [% Within 100 km. of ice-
free coast] 
0.158*** 0.216*** 0.171*** 0.058 0.069 
(0.053) (0.057) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) 
Log [land suitability for 
agriculture] 
-0.088 -0.022 0.005 -0.052 -0.076 
(0.115) (0.120) (0.097) (0.092) (0.106) 
Observations 116 116 137 142 142 
R-squared 0.625 0.696 0.714 0.612 0.601 
Continent FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Colonizer FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. 
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The economically and statistically significant relationship between Malaria Endemicity 
1900 and economic development seems apparent, although the reduced-form regression does not 
allow us to differentiate between a direct and indirect relationship. In the next sub-section, we 
explore the indirect relationship through institutional quality measures as was proposed by AJR 
2000. 
5.2 Instrumental Variable. 
We hypothesize that Malaria Endemicity 1900 only has an indirect effect on 
contemporary economic growth through the development of institutional quality during the 20th 
century because it was time invariant only until 1900, thus only affecting historic institutional 
quality. 
In table 12, we present our empirical estimation of the impact of institutional quality on 
economic growth using Malaria Endemicity 1900 as the instrumental variable and also including 
a large number of covariates, in particular, Malaria Ecology 1900. We report the OLS 
relationship between institutional quality and economic development for comparison purposes. 
The estimates presented in columns (4) and (5) of table 11 can be used to check the first-stage 
relationship between Malaria Endemicity 1900 and institutional quality. The Cragg-Donald 
statistic at the bottom of table 12 provides evidence that Malaria Endemicity 1900 is a non-weak 
instrument (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995; Cragg and Donald 1993; Stock and Yogo 2005). 
More specifically, as was mentioned in the previous section, the impact of Malaria Endemicity 
1900 is negative and significant in the case of WGI 1996 and Rule of Law 1996 equations, while 
Cragg-Donald statistic is 16.6 and 14.2 respectively, which is an indication that the Malaria 
Endemicity 1900 is a valid and non-weak instrument.  
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The estimates of institutional quality show that when instrumented with Malaria 
Endemicity 1900, the impact of institutional quality on economic development is considerably 
larger. The magnitude of the positive impact increases from 0.785 to 1.115, or approximately a 
30% increase in the case of the WGI indicator, and from 0.742 to 1.126, or approximately a 35% 
increase in the case of the Rule of Law. In other words, the impact of institutional quality 
appears to be largely underestimated when using OLS estimation. 
Table 12 OLS and IC estimates for the relationship between Malaria Endemicity 1900 and per 
capita income in 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
 Dependent variable: ln(Real GDP per capita 
2000)         
     
WGI 1996 0.785*** 1.115***   
 (0.068) (0.193)   
Rule of Law 1996   0.742*** 1.126*** 
   (0.061) (0.203) 
Log [Malaria Ecology (1900 population 
weighted)] 
0.000 0.012 0.005 0.023 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) 
Log [temperature] -0.231 -0.059 -0.335 -0.176 
 (0.377) (0.357) (0.361) (0.366) 
Log [precipitation] -0.267** -0.292*** -0.246** -0.266** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.107) (0.114) 
Log [absolute latitude] -0.117 -0.153* -0.137 -0.191** 
 (0.109) (0.091) (0.103) (0.097) 
Log [Neolithic transition timing (1500 CE 
baseline)] 
0.134 0.204 0.065 0.116 
(0.115) (0.129) (0.112) (0.130) 
Log [population density in 1500 CE] -0.036 -0.068 -0.061 -0.113* 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.049) (0.062) 
Log [terrain ruggedness] -0.010 0.001 -0.025 -0.019 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.044) (0.053) 
Log [% Within 100 km. of ice-free coast] 0.136*** 0.113*** 0.131*** 0.100*** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.038) 
Log [land suitability for agriculture] 0.022 0.061 0.036 0.091 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.071) (0.078) 
Observations 137 137 137 137 
R-squared 0.847 0.815 0.848 0.800 
Continent FE YES YES YES YES 
Colonizer FE YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Stat.  16.653  14.231 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. 
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5.3 Malaria Endemicity 1900 as a Substitute for Settler Mortality Data: A Replication of AJR 
(2001) 
In this section we replicate the results in AJR (2001) using Malaria Endemicity 1900 as a 
substitute for Settler Mortality because of its superiority, we argue, as an instrumental variable in 
the settling decisions made by Europeans. As in AJR (2001), the modern institution is measured 
as the Average protection against expropriation risk. The summary statistics for the variable of 
interest, outcomes, and covariates from AJR (2001) are presented in table 13. 
Table 13 Summary statistics of Malaria Endemicity 1900 and Malaria Ecology for replication of 
AJR’s (2001) tables 
VARIABLES 
Number 
of obs. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
Malaria Ecology (1900 Population-
weighted) 
80 6.708 8.447 0.000 31.556 
Malaria Endemicity (1900 Population-
weighted) 
80 2.825 1.342 0.000 4.912 
European settlers 1900, AJR 79 15.449 27.345 0.000 100.000 
average protection against expropriation 
risk 
69 6.481 1.574 3.500 10.000 
log PPP GDP pc in 1995, World Bank 74 7.948 1.012 6.109 10.216 
democracy in 1900 70 1.414 2.810 0.000 10.000 
constraint on executive in 1900 73 2.068 1.981 1.000 7.000 
log Settler Mortality 80 4.679 1.303 0.936 7.986 
Absolute latitude 80 16.707 12.599 1.000 60.000 
 
Table 14 Replication of table 3, panel B of AJR (2001) using Malaria Endemicity 1900 as a 
substitute for Settler Mortality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Constraint on 
Executive 
Democracy European settlers 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
-0.757**  -1.133*  -12.32**   
(0.215)  (0.386)  (4.380)   
Absolute 
latitude 
0.282 0.088 0.545 0.384 6.257 17.490 -0.095 
(0.143) (0.242) (0.259) (0.465) (3.913) (13.013) (0.135) 
Malaria 
Endemicity 
 -0.553**  -0.694*  -9.79*** 0.631* 
 (0.127)  (0.230)  (2.119) (0.243) 
Observations 73 86 70 83 79 140 80 
R-squared 0.265 0.177 0.334 0.191 0.482 0.395 0.471 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported below coefficients. 
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Table 14 is the replication of Panel B of table 3 in AJR (2001) and shows the relationship 
between Settler Mortality, as well as Malaria Endemicity 1900 and different measures of 
historical institutional quality controlling for absolute latitude. Just as Settler’s Mortality, 
Malaria Endemicity 1900 has a negative and significant impact on the constraint of the executive 
in 1900, democracy in 1900 and number of European settlers in 1900, with very similar 
significance levels and even magnitudes. Column 7 shows the relationship between Settler’s 
Mortality and Malaria Endemicity 1900. We see that Malaria Endemicity 1900 explains almost 
50% of the variation in Settler’s Mortality and has a significant positive relationship as expected.  
In column 1 of table 15, we re-estimate the specification from AJR’s (2001) table 4, 
column 8 which measures the impact of average protection against expropriation risk on per 
capita income in 1995. We chose to re-estimate the specification because it comes from the most 
conservative specification. Even though our estimates do not match AJR (2001) exactly, they are 
similar. The small Cragg-Donald statistic at the bottom of panel A and the barely significant 
coefficient in panel B provides evidence that Settler Mortality may be a weak instrument. In 
column 2, we re-estimate column 1 including the covariates from our specifications in columns 3 
and 4, when we use Malaria Endemicity 1900 as an instrument, which is Malaria Ecology and 
tropicality. The first-stage relationship in column 2 becomes insignificant, while the Cragg-
Donald statistics decreases, and the second-stage estimates are significantly smaller. 
In columns 3 and 4 of table 15, we estimate the impact of average protection against 
expropriation risk on per capita income in 1995 using Malaria Endemicity 1900 as the 
instrument. The Cragg-Donald statistics are larger than when Settler Mortality is used as an 
instrument which suggests a stronger instrument, although do not warrant non-weak instrument. 
Moreover, the first-stage coefficients in panel B are highly significant. The difference between 
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column 3 and 4 is related to the size of the data sample used. In column 3 we include all 
countries for which data are available, while in column 4, we include only those countries which 
were used in AJR (2001). The coefficient in column 3 is significantly larger than the coefficient 
in column 4 and not significantly different from the estimate in column 2, which used Settler 
Mortality as an instrument. However, since neither of these instruments is non-weak, then all of 
the second-stage estimates may not be consistent (Chao and Swanson 2005; Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker 1995). 
Table 15 Replication of table 4 from AJR (2001): Impact of institutional quality on modern per 
capita income using Malaria Endemicity 1900 as IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Second-stage Estimates  Dep. variable: log PPP GDP pc in 1995 
Average protection against expropriation risk 0.994** 0.736** 0.594*** 0.497*** 
(0.387) (0.331) (0.201) (0.178) 
% Tropical climate  -0.006 -0.007*** -0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Malaria Ecology (1900 Population-weighted)  0.006 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.043) (0.015) (0.028) 
Absolute latitude -0.132 -0.230* -0.248** -0.210** 
(0.158) (0.134) (0.117) (0.099) 
Continent FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 59 57 99 57 
R-squared 0.123 0.513 0.694 0.725 
Cragg-Donald Stat. 3.414 2.373 7.741 4.877 
  
Panel B: First-stage Estimates 
Dep. variable: average protection against 
expropriation risk 
Log Settler Mortality -0.338* -0.344   
(0.183) (0.223)   
Malaria Endemicity (1900 Population-weighted)   -0.407*** -0.525** 
  (0.146) (0.238) 
% Tropical climate  0.005 0.001 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Malaria Ecology (1900 Population-weighted)  -0.086 -0.022 -0.048 
 (0.060) (0.024) (0.062) 
Absolute latitude 0.187 0.209 0.166 0.166 
(0.181) (0.268) (0.203) (0.252) 
Continent FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 59 57 99 57 
R-squared 0.310 0.269 0.601 0.304 
Dataset 
AJR 
(2001) 
AJR 
(2001) 
ALL 
AJR 
(2001) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported below coefficients. 
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6. Implications and Conclusion 
In this paper, we contribute to debate on whether institutional quality is the causal key to 
economic development. As we have seen, before AJR (2001), the causal link between 
institutional quality and economic development was put into question because of the endogeneity 
involved--- since high-quality institutions can be as much the result of economic prosperity as 
they are their cause. What AJR (2001) offered was a plausible solution to the identification 
problem by using European colonial settler mortality rates as an instrumental variable for 
institutional quality. However, that instrumental variable has been questioned on the basis of 
unresolvable measurement errors, including that more than half of the sample countries were 
imputed mortality rates from other countries, often based on mistaken or conflicting evidence. 
The result has been that the relationship between mortality and expropriation risk—the main 
institutional quality indicator used in AJR (2001) -- appears to lack robustness, with the mortality 
rates instrumental-variable estimates becoming unreliable. 
In this paper we propose a substitute instrumental variable-- Malaria Endemicity 1900—
that is superior to AJR’s mortality rate in defining settlement decisions and subsequent quality of 
early and modern institutions, when malaria stability is accounted for (Kiszewski et al. 2004; 
MacDonald 1952). Malaria Endemicity 1900 measures the malaria environment before the 
discovery that the transmission channel was through mosquitos and the successful malaria 
eradication efforts that followed (Hay et al. 2004; Lysenko and Semashko 1968).  
Therefore, this measure is exogenous to both institutional quality and economic 
development. In this paper, we have argued that that Malaria Endemicity 1900 is a superior 
measure of disease and mortality environment that affected the settling decisions of European 
colonizers in establishing “inclusive” versus “extractive” institutions. The main question is, 
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would the malaria environment have had a significant impact on economic development if 
proper, high-quality institutions were already in place? We believe the answer is no, and that 
therefore the impact of malaria on economic development is only through institutional quality, 
which makes it an appropriate instrument. Our estimation results confirm the strength of Malaria 
Endemicity 1900 as an instrument for the quality of institutions. 
In our analysis, we find that Malaria Endemicity 1900 performs as a very strong 
instrument for modern institutions. In particular, we find that the impact of institutional quality is 
higher when instrumented by Malaria Endemicity 1900 compared to the estimation results using 
OLS. In replicating the findings in AJR (2001) using Malaria Endemicity 1900, we find a lower 
impact of average protection from expropriation risk on economic development compared to the 
results obtained using Settler Mortality as an instrument. 
The results obtained in this paper may not necessarily provide the definitive answer to the 
debate on the role of institutional quality in economic development, but they considerably 
strengthen the hypothesis of a significant causal effect. This is so because we successfully 
address the previous criticisms directed to the instrument used by AJR (2001). We do so by 
introducing a superior instrument, which is truly exogenous, and a more accurate measure of 
what affected the settling decisions of European colonizers in establishing “inclusive” versus 
“extractive” institutions.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Table 16A Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GDP per capita growth (WDI) 1591 2.086 4.175 -45.568 34.527 
Expenditure Decentralization 539 0.214 0.158 0.004 0.819 
Revenue Decentralization 567 0.180 0.145 0.001 0.842 
Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) 1308 33.18 9.3 0 47.5 
country size 2030 874015 2103191 575 16700000 
Population growth (WDI) 1782 0.018 0.016 -0.054 0.182 
Infant mortality (WDI) 1735 78.84 78.48 1.80 425.54 
Trade openness (PWT) 1666 72.04 45.55 1.95 410.24 
Political Rights (FH) 1563 3.732 2.186 1 7 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (AL) 2027 0.437 0.259 0.002 0.930 
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Table 17A Simple Random effect estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
      
Expenditure Decentralization 0.023*  
(0.013)  
Revenue Decentralization  0.032*** 
 (0.012) 
Log of Initial GDP per capita -2.226*** -2.241*** 
(0.472) (0.405) 
Population growth (WDI) -61.149** -60.616** 
(24.387) (25.102) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.034*** -0.032*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.008** 0.009** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.121 -0.079 
(0.105) (0.093) 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (AL) 0.504 -0.373 
(0.673) (0.632) 
Constant 22.372*** 22.661*** 
(4.498) (3.967) 
Regional dummies YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES 
Observations 285 301 
Number of countries 68 68 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 18A IV Random effect estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage 
First 
Stage 
Second 
Stage 
     
Expenditure Decentralization  0.042*   
 (0.022)   
Revenue Decentralization    0.041** 
   (0.021) 
Geographic Fragmentation Index 
(GFI) 
1.381***  1.455***  
(0.302)  (0.343)  
Log Country Size 4.051***  4.424***  
(0.865)  (0.889)  
Log of Initial GDP per capita 8.108*** -2.379*** 3.667 -2.293*** 
(3.055) (0.497) (2.784) (0.420) 
Population growth (WDI) 111.361 -58.663** -49.792 -60.958** 
(139.300) (25.583) (119.559) (25.813) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.023 -0.034*** -0.113** -0.031*** 
(0.073) (0.009) (0.057) (0.008) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.037 0.010** -0.054** 0.010** 
(0.025) (0.004) (0.025) (0.005) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.685 -0.072 -0.503 -0.052 
(0.506) (0.102) (0.517) (0.091) 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
(AL) 
-3.170 0.069 7.963 -0.753 
(8.666) (0.690) (9.329) (0.673) 
Constant -102.56*** 23.18*** -68.53*** 22.924*** 
(28.910) (4.566) (22.172) (4.006) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 288 285 304 301 
Number of countries 68 68 68 68 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 19A IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (Dep. Var. - Log GDP 
per capita growth) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
 0.007    0.018***    0.004   
 (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.012)   
Revenue 
Decentralization 
   0.006    0.026**    0.001 
   (0.007)    (0.012)    (0.011) 
Geographic 
Fragmentation Index 
1.222***  1.255**  1.038  0.832  2.530***  2.292***  
(0.451)  (0.564)  (0.697)  (0.659)  (0.316)  (0.407)  
Log Country Size 4.496***  4.587***  5.287***  3.389**  5.970***  5.818***  
(1.001)  (1.168)  (1.405)  (1.372)  (0.711)  (0.840)  
Log of Initial GDP 
per capita 
11.77*** -0.90*** 8.287** -0.8*** 16.646** -0.82*** 21.511*** -1.311*** 2.936 -0.57*** 3.167 -0.520** 
(3.099) (0.132) (3.262) (0.132) (7.256) (0.285) (5.809) (0.327) (2.947) (0.220) (2.879) (0.215) 
Population growth 
(WDI) 
-270.872 -27.7*** -323.854* -25.89** 281.977 17.707 210.450 14.065 -514*** -25.77** -386.56** -23.182* 
(178.594) (9.926) (163.415) (10.575) (356.445) (14.404) (326.024) (12.180) (188.211) (11.898) (191.286) (12.467) 
Infant mortality 
(WDI) 
0.116** -0.01*** 0.026 -0.01*** -1.63*** 0.068 -1.205* -0.023 0.099** -0.01*** 0.056 -0.008** 
(0.054) (0.002) (0.060) (0.003) (0.431) (0.062) (0.667) (0.045) (0.043) (0.003) (0.048) (0.003) 
Trade openness 
(PWT) 
-0.014 0.002 -0.046 0.003 0.062 0.002 -0.018 0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.021 0.001 
(0.044) (0.002) (0.052) (0.002) (0.069) (0.003) (0.076) (0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.041) (0.003) 
Political Rights (FH) -1.320 0.016 -0.527 0.005 3.044*** -0.275** 1.662 -0.116 -1.300** -0.061 -0.500 -0.058 
(0.886) (0.041) (1.034) (0.037) (0.962) (0.135) (1.340) (0.107) (0.640) (0.045) (0.838) (0.039) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
(AL) 
1.723 0.162 10.468 0.061 22.576** -0.75*** 34.888** -1.044** -16.97** 0.313 -15.486* 0.191 
(8.304) (0.293) (11.122) (0.293) (9.193) (0.259) (13.035) (0.450) (7.582) (0.548) (8.814) (0.536) 
Constant -129.8*** 8.966*** -105.7*** 8.660*** -172.3** 7.176** -217.5*** 12.675*** -97.4*** 6.045*** -99.01*** 5.690*** 
(30.825) (1.244) (28.580) (1.280) (76.748) (3.278) (62.079) (2.946) (26.253) (2.072) (23.404) (2.088) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 288 236 304 249 140 124 149 133 148 112 155 116 
R-squared 0.569 0.256 0.516 0.269 0.672 0.406 0.692 0.354 0.736 0.378 0.722 0.404 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 20A OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (controlling for other fiscal 
decentralization variable) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
0.902*** 0.043   0.337 0.817*** 0.005  0.082 0.878*** 0.012  -2.056 
(0.076) (0.075)   (0.381) (0.155) (0.015)  (0.082) (0.068) (0.137)  (5.168) 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
 -0.023 0.797*** -0.256   0.015 0.706*** -0.033   0.029 0.897*** 1.899 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.318)   (0.016) (0.082) (0.053)   (0.145) (0.059) (4.681) 
Geographic 
Fragmentation Index 
0.061   0.281   0.319   0.147   0.501**   0.022  
(0.260)   (0.293)   (0.468)   (0.353)   (0.217)   (0.193)  
Log Country Size 0.780   0.581   2.650**   -0.505   1.202**   0.116  
(0.644)   (0.675)   (1.022)   (0.939)   (0.548)   (0.473)  
Log of Initial GDP per 
capita 
2.080 -1.88*** 1.017 -2.26*** -3.190 -2.09*** 12.53*** -3.016** -0.858 -1.454** 1.656 1.843 
(1.426) (0.431) (1.438) (0.699) (5.983) (0.394) (4.333) (1.223) (1.142) (0.631) (1.120) (7.937) 
Population growth 
(WDI) 
-60.777 -64.8*** -18.738 -64.25** 129.331 -4.025 -12.244 -7.104 -242.9** -40.240 151.419* 277.716 
(99.892) (22.419) (79.969) (25.975) (207.414) (27.763) (195.761) (30.400) (95.444) (41.304) (79.269) (757.419) 
Infant mortality 
(WDI) 
0.039* -0.02*** -0.015 -0.021 -0.308 -0.027 -0.469 0.018 0.021 -0.022** -0.003 -0.027 
(0.021) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.401) (0.114) (0.431) (0.119) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.030) 
Trade openness 
(PWT) 
0.008 0.008** -0.017 0.021 0.074* 0.007** -0.059 0.014* 0.013 0.011 -0.015 -0.021 
(0.023) (0.004) (0.024) (0.016) (0.038) (0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.082) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.572* -0.091 0.160 -0.180 1.245* -0.475 0.053 -0.499 -0.651** -0.175 0.367 0.647 
(0.337) (0.097) (0.332) (0.180) (0.722) (0.350) (0.897) (0.347) (0.293) (0.143) (0.321) (2.269) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization (AL) 
-9.264** -0.253 10.953** -3.883 -4.645 -1.261** 17.387** -2.878 -6.49*** 1.043 3.311 8.064 
(3.746) (1.129) (4.869) (5.398) (8.393) (0.504) (8.263) (2.013) (2.392) (1.678) (2.599) (15.935) 
Constant -10.372 19.5*** -24.161 24.12*** 23.643 21.94*** -118*** 30.122** 1.896 14.131** -23.983* -33.686 
(17.718) (3.924) (16.490) (7.811) (63.598) (4.700) (40.724) (11.695) (13.301) (6.277) (13.465) (114.435) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 283 280 283 280 140 138 140 138 143 142 143 142 
R-squared 0.882 0.309 0.872 -0.268 0.861 0.496 0.871 0.420 0.945 0.426 0.943 -6.053 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 21A IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (10-year averages) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
 0.058*       0.029**      0.095   
 (0.030)       (0.011)      (0.071)   
Revenue 
Decentralization 
     0.044**      0.065***      0.061* 
     (0.019)      (0.025)      (0.034) 
Geographic 
Fragmentation 
Index 
0.792   0.962*   0.966   0.777   1.140**   1.124**  
(0.505)   (0.559)   (0.815)   (0.748)   (0.513)   (0.492)  
Log Country 
Size 
3.364***   3.813***   5.488***   3.553**   2.697**   3.254***  
(1.227)   (1.217)   (1.744)   (1.613)   (1.303)   (1.195)  
Log of Initial 
GDP per capita 
14.54*** -2.632*** 9.874** -2.138*** 14.312** -2.002*** 19.68*** -3.305*** 12.23*** -2.829** 9.730** -2.209*** 
(3.849) (0.664) (4.562) (0.312) (5.901) (0.461) (6.341) (0.695) (4.245) (1.144) (4.341) (0.436) 
Population 
growth (WDI) 
-1.495 -31.581 109.914 -47.35*** 285.085 20.195 152.800 42.566 270.023 -53.226* 374.063 -57.682** 
(239.094) (21.546) (255.556) (17.248) (555.46) (21.502) (502.27) (32.246) (288.50) (28.456) (279.175) (23.172) 
Infant mortality 
(WDI) 
0.078 -0.042*** -0.034 -0.033*** -1.673** 0.016 -1.477 0.020 0.110 -0.041*** 0.036 -0.029*** 
(0.083) (0.009) (0.093) (0.006) (0.701) (0.073) (0.900) (0.086) (0.078) (0.013) (0.088) (0.006) 
Trade openness 
(PWT) 
-0.052 0.009* -0.080 0.008 0.058 0.010*** -0.020 0.014*** -0.115** 0.018 -0.141** 0.009 
(0.057) (0.005) (0.066) (0.005) (0.077) (0.003) (0.084) (0.003) (0.054) (0.015) (0.067) (0.010) 
Political Rights 
(FH) 
-0.234 -0.163 0.575 -0.097 3.107** -0.402 2.546 -0.262 0.276 -0.380** 0.796 -0.276* 
(1.246) (0.120) (1.313) (0.111) (1.378) (0.300) (1.781) (0.304) (1.401) (0.191) (1.592) (0.153) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
(AL) 
2.015 0.337 9.206 -0.527 22.854** -1.160** 34.599** -2.547** -19.207 2.445* -19.116 1.477 
(8.496) (0.688) (10.638) (0.623) (9.192) (0.458) (13.565) (1.227) (13.348) (1.348) (14.177) (1.152) 
Constant -147*** 26.636*** -116.4** 22.822*** -152.4** 20.948*** -202*** 33.009*** -142*** 28.234*** -123*** 23.039*** 
(38.165) (5.821) (45.943) (2.818) (67.965) (4.725) (69.965) (6.758) (34.821) (10.134) (37.286) (4.040) 
Regional 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 150 150 156 156 69 69 72 72 81 81 84 84 
R-squared 0.544 0.480 0.481 0.552 0.678 0.642 0.680 0.568 0.589 0.549 0.612 0.665 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 22A IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (Only GFI as an IV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
 -0.090       -0.051      0.124   
 (0.081)       (0.052)      (0.125)   
Revenue 
Decentralization 
     -0.122      -0.176      0.384 
     (0.117)      (0.678)      (0.487) 
Geographic 
Fragmentation 
Index 
-0.300   -0.274   -0.411   -0.102   0.251   0.159  
(0.186)   (0.209)   (0.346)   (0.397)   (0.233)   (0.267)  
Log of Initial 
GDP per capita 
14.483*** -0.384 10.474*** -0.455 20.214** -0.437 23.147*** 1.972 8.170* -2.217* 8.006** -4.120 
(3.519) (1.240) (3.794) (1.361) (9.216) (1.426) (6.144) (15.992) (4.465) (1.239) (3.828) (3.968) 
Population growth 
(WDI) 
-102.097 -74.7*** -199.273 -95.67** -154.076 -16.511 -76.939 -13.666 -0.812 -38.575 33.849 -44.726 
(181.284) (26.375) (180.564) (48.219) (472.853) (34.793) (381.591) (92.153) (242.328) (38.703) (237.234) (76.538) 
Infant mortality 
(WDI) 
0.153*** -0.011 0.058 -0.018 -2.61*** -0.216 -1.738** -0.502 0.143*** -0.035* 0.114** -0.056 
(0.054) (0.018) (0.065) (0.017) (0.743) (0.184) (0.821) (1.224) (0.050) (0.020) (0.048) (0.055) 
Trade openness 
(PWT) 
-0.138*** -0.004 -0.174*** -0.014 -0.046 0.007 -0.086 -0.006 -0.19*** 0.028 -0.22*** 0.089 
(0.037) (0.011) (0.037) (0.019) (0.080) (0.007) (0.064) (0.054) (0.054) (0.027) (0.053) (0.113) 
Political Rights 
(FH) 
-0.865 -0.212 0.272 -0.012 4.220** -0.147 2.316 0.324 0.110 -0.234* 1.221 -0.564 
(1.140) (0.175) (1.398) (0.251) (1.545) (0.414) (1.601) (1.873) (1.058) (0.137) (1.240) (0.661) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
(AL) 
7.167 0.698 16.386 1.624 23.469 0.270 35.012** 5.582 -13.885 1.800 -15.301 4.879 
(9.032) (1.002) (10.107) (1.651) (13.838) (1.551) (13.220) (23.531) (11.882) (1.893) (12.081) (6.702) 
Constant -96.24*** 8.238 -67.747* 8.891 -123.196 9.987 -180.34** -8.254 -69.615* 20.061** -72.72** 36.295 
(32.875) (9.858) (36.334) (11.167) (96.531) (12.036) (66.756) (127.927) (37.911) (9.967) (33.715) (32.982) 
Regional 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 288 285 304 301 140 138 149 147 148 147 155 154 
R-squared 0.447 -0.032 0.370 -0.193 0.542 0.280 0.639 -0.491 0.531 0.325 0.548 -0.885 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 23A IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (Only Log Country Size 
as an IV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
 0.010       0.010      -0.013   
 (0.019)       (0.011)      (0.087)   
Revenue 
Decentralization 
     0.007      0.025      -0.062 
     (0.021)      (0.023)      (0.078) 
Log Country Size 1.997***   2.108***   3.109***   1.636   0.756   1.233**  
(0.510)   (0.519)   (1.073)   (1.216)   (0.574)   (0.603)  
Log of Initial GDP 
per capita 12.34*** -1.886*** 8.066** -1.900*** 15.090* 
-
1.827*** 20.29*** -2.814*** 8.447** -1.079 7.716** -0.613 
(3.410) (0.477) (3.783) (0.472) (7.888) (0.337) (5.753) (0.468) (4.126) (0.956) (3.522) (0.938) 
Population growth 
(WDI) 
-175.479 -62.64*** -257.999 -68.39*** 132.645 -5.449 85.947 2.167 -46.495 -40.416 -37.372 -39.952 
(182.280) (23.066) (162.276) (26.088) (361.43) (27.350) (340.177) (23.134) (244.87) (32.293) (221.852) (44.595) 
Infant mortality 
(WDI) 
0.107* -0.029*** 0.010 -0.028*** -1.96*** -0.053 -1.414* -0.143 0.111* -0.017 0.069 -0.010 
(0.062) (0.009) (0.070) (0.008) (0.641) (0.120) (0.781) (0.099) (0.059) (0.016) (0.061) (0.015) 
Trade openness 
(PWT) 
-0.11*** 0.007* -0.15*** 0.005 -0.034 0.007* -0.094* 0.009*** -0.2*** -0.001 -0.23*** -0.016 
(0.034) (0.004) (0.034) (0.004) (0.061) (0.004) (0.054) (0.003) (0.052) (0.022) (0.055) (0.022) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.926 -0.106 -0.020 -0.043 3.063** -0.432 1.609 -0.221 0.048 -0.213 0.851 -0.034 
(1.034) (0.098) (1.259) (0.101) (1.265) (0.354) (1.429) (0.285) (1.079) (0.166) (1.313) (0.237) 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
(AL) 
8.152 0.225 16.665* -0.244 26.02** -0.974** 37.12*** -1.355* -9.105 0.281 -11.772 -1.338 
(8.223) (0.576) (8.917) (0.579) (11.503) (0.415) (11.827) (0.797) (10.806) (2.261) (11.524) (2.705) 
Constant -88.13** 19.489*** -54.754 19.919*** -106.949 19.95*** -165*** 29.969*** -58.273 11.830 -55.964 7.858 
(33.836) (4.374) (37.352) (4.441) (79.004) (4.111) (58.486) (4.188) (38.085) (7.552) (33.668) (8.186) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 288 285 304 301 140 138 149 147 148 147 155 154 
R-squared 0.515 0.312 0.452 0.376 0.634 0.491 0.668 0.510 0.537 0.370 0.575 0.342 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 24A Description and Sources of variables used in regressions. 
Variable Description Source 
Expenditure 
decentralization 
Share of subnational expenditure in total 
government expenditure 
IMF GFS 
Revenue 
decentralization 
Share of subnational revenue in total 
government revenue 
IMF GFS 
GFI Geographic Fragmentation Index Canavire-Bacarreza, 
Martinez-Vazquez and 
Yedgenov (2017) 
Country size Country area size (residual after regressing on 
GFI) 
Canavire-Bacarreza, 
Martinez-Vazquez and 
Yedgenov (2017) 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency 
WDI 
Political Rights Index of political rights freedom, graded 
between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
Freedom House 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Index of ethnic fractionalization, a higher value 
indicates higher fractionalization and more 
diversity of ethnicities. 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP) in constant international dollars. 
WDI 
Infant mortality A number of infants dying before reaching one 
year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. 
WDI 
Openness Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per 
capita in current prices. 
Penn World Tables 
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Appendix B 
Table 25A Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth 2816 1.60 5.36 -46.89 37.84 
Std. Dev. of GDP per capita growth 2830 3.29 3.46 0.12 47.63 
GDP per capita 2811 6634 9143 102 51934 
M1 money growth 2314 0.47 3.54 -0.548 116.734 
Std. Dev. of M1 money growth 2430 0.49 2.83 0.006 47.915 
Openness 2813 78.358 52.328 0.309 446.064 
Overall tax burden 2202 27.934 12.869 3.619 60.500 
PIT 2067 4.806 4.855 0.009 26.228 
CIT 2064 2.838 2.315 0.007 24.207 
SSCPAY 1870 5.515 5.072 0.000 19.753 
GST 2056 4.705 3.019 0.000 16.394 
MRP 2138 0.060 0.038 0.000 0.184 
Tax mix ratio 1 1908 1.934 3.655 0.073 86.000 
Tax mix ratio 2 1908 1.609 3.563 0.073 86.000 
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Table 26A Tax Mix Ratio baseline estimations – All countries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.064** 0.066*** 0.065** 0.067*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.118* 0.140* 0.118* 0.140* 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.073) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.003 0.028 0.000 0.026 
 (0.055) (0.067) (0.054) (0.066) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.154 -0.167* -0.154 -0.167* 
 (0.093) (0.098) (0.094) (0.099) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.992* -0.888 -1.004* -0.901 
 (0.578) (0.595) (0.581) (0.595) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.330 -0.187 -0.392 -0.236 
 (0.716) (0.821) (0.712) (0.819) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -1.252 -0.867 -1.249 -0.862 
 (0.829) (0.933) (0.830) (0.934) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.050** -1.757* -2.046** -1.745* 
 (0.801) (0.904) (0.801) (0.904) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.583* -1.436 -1.586* -1.433 
 (0.836) (0.969) (0.837) (0.970) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.963** -1.588 -1.970** -1.593 
 (0.885) (0.963) (0.885) (0.964) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -95.201 -19.291 -98.227 -20.522 
 (117.715) (158.356) (117.385) (157.258) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -21.394  -21.769 
  (13.977)  (13.796) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as direct taxes -0.521*** -0.482***   
 (0.139) (0.154)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax 
as indirect taxes   -0.526*** -0.487*** 
   (0.146) (0.164) 
Constant 4.562*** 4.052** 4.551*** 4.039** 
 (1.667) (1.922) (1.668) (1.922) 
     
Observations 253 238 253 238 
R-squared 0.225 0.248 0.224 0.248 
Number of countries 87 85 87 85 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 27A Tax Mix Ratio baseline estimations – High-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.048 0.056* 0.044 0.055* 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.132 0.143 0.130 0.142 
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.086) (0.094) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP -0.020 0.074 -0.027 0.075 
 (0.067) (0.057) (0.071) (0.055) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -1.220*** -1.263*** -1.227*** -1.258*** 
 (0.191) (0.167) (0.185) (0.167) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -1.086*** -1.005*** -1.109*** -1.086*** 
 (0.328) (0.349) (0.361) (0.372) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.805 -0.233 -0.963* -0.367 
 (0.552) (0.593) (0.544) (0.527) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -2.004** -1.282* -2.071** -1.390* 
 (0.741) (0.683) (0.754) (0.686) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.475** -1.908** -2.529** -2.020** 
 (0.935) (0.746) (0.984) (0.822) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.951 -1.254 -2.021 -1.416 
 (1.234) (0.984) (1.290) (1.113) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -2.685** -2.131** -2.763** -2.318** 
 (1.232) (0.915) (1.343) (1.099) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -232.230** 94.609 -232.636** 93.370 
 (97.976) (228.359) (103.298) (234.902) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -36.839**  -37.094** 
  (17.118)  (17.413) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as direct 
taxes -0.359 -0.399   
 (0.295) (0.297)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as indirect 
taxes   -0.341 -0.561 
   (0.509) (0.569) 
Constant 14.815*** 12.803*** 14.947*** 12.820*** 
 (3.144) (2.551) (3.067) (2.487) 
     
Observations 91 88 91 88 
R-squared 0.487 0.544 0.484 0.543 
Number of countries 30 29 30 29 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 28A Tax Mix Ratio baseline estimation – Low-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.072** 0.085*** 0.073** 0.083*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.113 0.139 0.114 0.141 
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.093) (0.100) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.072) (0.079) (0.072) (0.079) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.129 -0.133 -0.130 -0.134 
 (0.098) (0.107) (0.098) (0.108) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.503 -0.303 -0.482 -0.286 
 (0.802) (0.977) (0.808) (0.981) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.316 -0.517 -0.282 -0.470 
 (1.100) (1.222) (1.096) (1.219) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -0.766 -0.702 -0.719 -0.645 
 (1.216) (1.262) (1.216) (1.265) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -1.585 -1.699 -1.547 -1.647 
 (1.156) (1.227) (1.159) (1.234) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.211 -1.769 -1.181 -1.725 
 (1.214) (1.331) (1.222) (1.344) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.336 -1.543 -1.306 -1.503 
 (1.400) (1.472) (1.408) (1.485) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -45.405 -21.235 -49.222 -24.639 
 (175.650) (218.379) (175.338) (217.081) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) * PIT Revenue to GDP  -30.296  -30.484 
  (88.317)  (88.691) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes -0.505*** -0.472**   
 (0.186) (0.185)   
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes   -0.497*** -0.461** 
   (0.185) (0.183) 
Constant 4.568** 3.765 4.507** 3.706 
 (2.154) (2.478) (2.142) (2.464) 
     
Observations 162 150 162 150 
R-squared 0.206 0.231 0.205 0.229 
Number of countries 57 56 57 56 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 29A Tax Mix Ratio and Government Size Interactions – All countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ALL-Rev ALL-Rev ALL-Exp ALL-Exp 
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.064** 0.065** 0.063 0.062 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.058) (0.058) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.120* 0.120* 0.138** 0.139** 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.065) (0.065) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP -0.011 -0.010 -0.061 -0.067 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.097) (0.097) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.156* -0.156* -0.200 -0.200 
(0.093) (0.094) (0.152) (0.153) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.976 -0.982 -1.459*** -1.482*** 
(0.589) (0.605) (0.370) (0.353) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.310 -0.369 -1.250* -1.380** 
(0.716) (0.719) (0.747) (0.671) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -1.232 -1.231 -2.661*** -2.737*** 
(0.842) (0.845) (0.747) (0.689) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.029** -2.029** -3.350*** -3.419*** 
(0.811) (0.813) (0.930) (0.875) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.555* -1.564* -2.930*** -2.996*** 
(0.846) (0.849) (1.074) (1.022) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.916** -1.932** -3.228*** -3.297*** 
(0.909) (0.913) (1.019) (0.969) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -97.113 -99.010 -118.063 -116.089 
(118.912) (118.073) (111.045) (110.157) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as direct 
taxes 
-0.616**  -0.438  
(0.236)  (0.580)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP 0.009    
(0.015)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.597**  -0.488 
 (0.244)  (0.739) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP 
 0.007   
 (0.018)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP 
  0.004  
  (0.018)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP 
   0.005 
   (0.024) 
Constant 4.677*** 4.625*** 6.251** 6.360** 
(1.730) (1.722) (2.775) (2.791) 
Observations 253 253 205 205 
R-squared 0.226 0.225 0.194 0.194 
Number of countries 87 87 82 82 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 30A Tax Mix Ratio and Government Size Interactions – High-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High-Rev High-Rev High-Exp High-Exp 
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.029 0.034 1.519 1.439 
(0.033) (0.036) (2.030) (2.018) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.138 0.137 0.153* 0.155* 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.086) (0.086) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.122 0.113 -0.100 -0.097 
(0.116) (0.131) (0.101) (0.096) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -1.144*** -1.130*** -0.367 -0.315 
(0.161) (0.161) (0.478) (0.475) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -1.210*** -1.328*** -1.136** -1.262*** 
(0.244) (0.306) (0.442) (0.439) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.936* -1.049* -1.367 -1.522* 
(0.512) (0.533) (1.028) (0.880) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -2.195*** -2.177*** -2.455** -2.599** 
(0.636) (0.671) (1.078) (1.025) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.816*** -2.761*** -2.769* -2.936** 
(0.790) (0.863) (1.361) (1.330) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -2.430* -2.369* -1.904 -2.135 
(1.190) (1.257) (1.571) (1.558) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -3.149*** -3.099** -2.580 -2.830* 
(1.128) (1.243) (1.544) (1.564) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -225.238** -228.490** -218.861* -219.902* 
(99.123) (105.862) (120.069) (123.658) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as direct 
taxes 
0.677  -0.386  
(0.653)  (0.612)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP -0.048*    
(0.026)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 0.931  -0.577 
 (0.722)  (1.035) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP 
 -0.055   
 (0.033)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP 
  0.002  
  (0.014)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP 
   -0.000 
   (0.019) 
Constant 10.294*** 10.261** 9.615** 9.366** 
(3.659) (3.928) (4.543) (4.522) 
Observations 91 91 80 80 
R-squared 0.503 0.498 0.474 0.476 
Number of countries 30 30 29 29 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 31A Tax Mix Ratio and Government Size Interactions – Low-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low-Rev Low-Rev Low-Exp Low-Exp 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.070** 0.070** 0.161* 0.148* 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.088) (0.082) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.121 0.121 0.137 0.137 
(0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax Revenue to GDP -0.018 -0.014 -0.010 -0.015 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.188) (0.187) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.129 -0.130 -0.212 -0.212 
(0.097) (0.098) (0.153) (0.153) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.381 -0.381   
(0.842) (0.843)   
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.081 -0.092 1.366 1.347 
(1.182) (1.170) (1.177) (1.176) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -0.611 -0.601 0.372 0.345 
(1.298) (1.287) (1.164) (1.160) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -1.458 -1.453 -0.824 -0.841 
(1.222) (1.213) (1.039) (1.039) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.104 -1.107 -0.699 -0.708 
(1.259) (1.256) (1.176) (1.181) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.232 -1.237 -0.808 -0.827 
(1.450) (1.445) (1.282) (1.290) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -47.578 -49.606 -76.224 -79.034 
(175.931) (175.367) (173.880) (173.472) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
-0.696**  -2.890  
(0.291)  (1.968)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Revenue to GDP 0.021    
(0.018)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.664**  -3.112 
 (0.278)  (2.111) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Revenue to GDP 
 0.019   
 (0.018)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Expenditure to GDP 
  0.113  
  (0.082)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Expenditure to GDP 
   0.122 
   (0.088) 
Constant 4.579** 4.514** 3.405 3.509 
(2.178) (2.166) (4.345) (4.313) 
Observations 162 162 125 125 
R-squared 0.209 0.208 0.173 0.174 
Number of countries 57 57 53 53 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 32A Tax Mix Ratio and Direct vs Indirect Revenue interactions – All countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ALL-Rev ALL-Rev ALL-Exp ALL-Exp 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.064** 0.065** 0.061** 0.063** 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.118* 0.118* 0.116* 0.116* 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP -0.000 -0.001 0.025 0.021 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.154 -0.155 -0.149 -0.150 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.988* -0.999 -0.971* -0.991* 
(0.586) (0.603) (0.578) (0.582) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.335 -0.389 -0.282 -0.348 
(0.717) (0.713) (0.702) (0.697) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -1.258 -1.249 -1.156 -1.163 
(0.831) (0.833) (0.807) (0.804) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.055** -2.046** -1.926** -1.937** 
(0.802) (0.803) (0.768) (0.765) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.581* -1.583* -1.419* -1.444* 
(0.838) (0.842) (0.784) (0.783) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.930** -1.950** -2.090** -2.101** 
(0.932) (0.950) (0.901) (0.907) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -94.676 -97.825 -96.680 -99.967 
(117.312) (116.481) (116.517) (116.088) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as direct 
taxes 
-0.567*  -0.433**  
(0.322)  (0.175)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP 0.004    
(0.020)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.552  -0.439** 
 (0.357)  (0.181) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP 
 0.002   
 (0.025)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
  -0.072  
  (0.084)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
   -0.071 
   (0.085) 
Constant 4.613** 4.571** 4.730*** 4.712*** 
(1.800) (1.762) (1.662) (1.662) 
Observations 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.225 0.224 0.230 0.229 
Number of countries 87 87 87 87 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 33A Tax Mix Ratio and Direct vs. Indirect Revenue interactions – High-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High-Rev High-Rev High-Exp High-Exp 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.034 0.026 0.012 0.021 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.136 0.136 0.127 0.134 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.083) (0.086) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.014 0.023 0.077 0.060 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.058) (0.062) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -1.190*** -1.162*** -1.269*** -1.263*** 
(0.182) (0.171) (0.180) (0.165) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -1.083*** -1.210*** -0.816** -0.883** 
(0.304) (0.306) (0.356) (0.358) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.738 -0.954* -0.523 -0.678 
(0.533) (0.528) (0.487) (0.464) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -1.789** -1.891*** -1.095** -1.204** 
(0.737) (0.682) (0.517) (0.578) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -2.301** -2.397** -1.538* -1.709* 
(0.929) (0.895) (0.779) (0.881) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.840 -1.995 -1.090 -1.298 
(1.225) (1.247) (1.025) (1.178) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -3.001** -3.321** -4.044*** -3.996*** 
(1.202) (1.376) (1.137) (1.153) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -236.412** -240.357** -251.137** -251.508** 
(103.392) (111.079) (93.618) (103.216) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
0.445  0.214  
(0.782)  (0.406)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP -0.032    
(0.023)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 1.033  0.523 
 (0.860)  (0.706) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP 
 -0.056*   
 (0.028)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
  -0.338**  
  (0.126)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
   -0.331*** 
   (0.114) 
Constant 13.135*** 12.265*** 18.153*** 17.488*** 
(3.248) (3.060) (3.134) (2.635) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.495 0.498 0.535 0.522 
Number of countries 30 30 30 30 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 34A Tax Mix Ratio and Direct vs. Indirect Revenue interactions – Low-income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low-Rev Low-Rev Low-Exp Low-Exp 
          
Standard deviation of M1 money growth 0.071** 0.070** 0.070** 0.071** 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
SD of Trade Openness 0.115 0.117 0.110 0.111 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.017 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) to +10 (autocratic) -0.129 -0.130 -0.127 -0.127 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.098) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 4, 1985-89 -0.452 -0.427 -0.505 -0.487 
(0.849) (0.854) (0.806) (0.812) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 5, 1990-94 -0.197 -0.152 -0.328 -0.303 
(1.174) (1.161) (1.091) (1.089) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 6, 1995-99 -0.691 -0.640 -0.768 -0.728 
(1.293) (1.286) (1.202) (1.199) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 7, 2000-04 -1.530 -1.492 -1.556 -1.520 
(1.204) (1.200) (1.120) (1.119) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 8, 2005-09 -1.159 -1.131 -1.117 -1.083 
(1.251) (1.252) (1.156) (1.155) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 = 9, 2010-14 -1.238 -1.209 -1.368 -1.342 
(1.494) (1.486) (1.373) (1.377) 
PIT Progressivity (MRP) -41.190 -44.392 -49.489 -53.992 
(173.866) (173.428) (173.079) (172.551) 
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
direct taxes 
-0.651  -0.452**  
(0.512)  (0.214)  
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Direct Revenue to GDP 0.015    
(0.041)    
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, with property tax as 
indirect taxes 
 -0.661  -0.440** 
 (0.506)  (0.214) 
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Direct Revenue to GDP 
 0.017   
 (0.041)   
Tax Mix Ratio 1 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
  -0.053  
  (0.113)  
Tax Mix Ratio 2 * Indirect Revenue to GDP 
   -0.059 
   (0.117) 
Constant 4.587** 4.523** 4.633** 4.597** 
(2.170) (2.157) (2.156) (2.151) 
Observations 162 162 162 162 
R-squared 0.207 0.206 0.208 0.208 
Number of countries 57 57 57 57 
 Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 35A Tax Mix Ratio Instrumental Variable Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ALL ALL High High Low Low 
              
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, 
with property tax as direct 
taxes 
-0.865  -1.065  1.913  
(0.959)  (1.118)  (3.034)  
Ratio of direct to indirect taxes, 
with property tax as indirect 
taxes 
 -0.877  -1.049  1.011 
 (0.932)  (1.083)  (1.865) 
Standard deviation of M1 
money growth 
0.091*** 0.093*** 0.121** 0.113** 0.120*** 0.109*** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.055) (0.052) (0.034) (0.023) 
Standard deviation of Trade 
Openness 
0.081 0.081 -0.006 -0.009 0.162* 0.148* 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062) (0.097) (0.084) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$) 
0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Revenue to GDP 0.011 0.010 0.022 0.014 0.059 0.044 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.048) (0.046) (0.076) (0.051) 
Polity score: -10 (democratic) 
to +10 (autocratic) 
-0.060 -0.061 -0.027 -0.031 -0.002 -0.025 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.045) (0.098) (0.075) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 2, 1976-79 
0.709 0.694 -0.676 -0.729 0.523 0.869 
(0.625) (0.612) (0.603) (0.578) (1.310) (0.921) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 3, 1980-84 
1.222* 1.225* 0.146 0.167 0.186 0.775 
(0.723) (0.715) (0.745) (0.772) (2.066) (1.339) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 4, 1985-89 
0.171 0.171 -1.418* -1.453* -0.251 0.149 
(0.641) (0.637) (0.800) (0.834) (1.516) (1.065) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 5, 1990-94 
1.434 1.347 -0.041 -0.481 0.939 1.335 
(0.994) (0.954) (0.986) (0.768) (1.585) (1.222) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 6, 1995-99 
0.410 0.411 -0.887 -1.085 0.239 0.473 
(0.721) (0.730) (0.915) (0.906) (1.367) (1.145) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 7, 2000-04 
-0.489 -0.471 -2.015** -2.142** -0.952 -0.566 
(0.690) (0.701) (0.926) (0.902) (1.574) (1.147) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 8, 2005-09 
0.351 0.384 -0.535 -0.637 -1.228 -0.596 
(0.769) (0.784) (0.861) (0.807) (2.425) (1.694) 
5-year period from 1970-2010 
= 9, 2010-14 
-0.746 -0.696 -2.588*** -2.653*** -1.585 -1.015 
(0.729) (0.749) (0.971) (0.913) (2.236) (1.625) 
Observations 524 524 189 189 335 335 
R-squared 0.126 0.127 0.161 0.189 -0.239 0.028 
Number of countries 112 112 39 39 73 73 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 36A Description of variables and sources 
Variable Description Source 
SD Growth Standard deviation of growth rate of real GDP 
per capita 
WDI 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita WDI 
SD M1 growth Standard deviation of M1 annual money 
growth 
WDI 
Openness Import plus export, % of GDP WDI 
Overall tax 
burden 
Total  tax revenues, % of GDP GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
PIT Personal income tax, % of GDP GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
CIT Corporate income tax, % of GDP GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
SSCPAY Social security and payroll  taxes, % of GDP GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
GST General tax on goods and services, % of GDP GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
MRP Marginal  rate progression up to an income 
level equivalent to four times countries’ per 
capita GDP in local currency 
WTI 
Tax mix 
ratio 1 
Direct (personal and corporate income tax, 
payroll tax, social security  contributions, 
property  tax)  to indirect  (tax on goods and 
services, excise tax, customs duty)  taxes ratio 
GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
Tax mix 
ratio 2 
Direct (personal and corporate income tax, 
payroll tax, social security  contributions) to 
indirect  (property tax,  general tax  on goods 
and services, excise tax,  customs duty) taxes 
ratio 
GFS, OECD  Revenue 
Statistics 
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